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INTRODUCTION 
Federal sentencing is facing a crisis—and it is not for the usual 
reasons, i.e., the severity of drug sentences and racial disparities. 
Instead, there is a raging public debate about sentencing for the crime 
of child pornography. Child pornography is virtually the new crack 
cocaine in the sentencing world.1 Judges, congressmen, academics, 
and the media are loudly and heatedly arguing about the status of 
child pornography sentencing for novel reasons, though the central 
issues are familiar: severity and disparity. 
One may wonder how we got to this point. Twenty-five years ago, 
federal sentencing moved from an indeterminate sentencing system 
regime to a guidelines-based system operating under the auspices of 
the newly created United States Sentencing Commission (the 
Commission).2 The benefit of guidelines is their normative value, 
which can foster certainty, fairness, and national uniformity.3 
Congress tried to reach those goals by making the guidelines 
mandatory on the federal judiciary.4 Yet two lodestar decisions from 
the United States Supreme Court are at the core of current legal and 
policy debates. In United States v. Booker in 2005, the Court 
rendered the federal guidelines merely advisory, permitting 
sentencing judges to vary from guidelines’ recommendations based 
on the individual characteristics of the defendant or the 
circumstances of the offense.5 Then in Kimbrough v. United States in 
2007, the Court, in a case involving crack cocaine trafficking, 
extended discretion to permit a categorical rejection to a guideline for 
policy reasons, even if the rejection applies to a whole class of 
offenders.6 Many judges have interpreted Kimbrough as not being 
limited to crack cocaine and have applied its rationale to reject 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Michael J. Pelgro, Child Pornography: The New Crack Cocaine?, BOS. B.J., Summer 2012, at 
xxiv. 
 2. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362–63 (1989). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2006); United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 890–91 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2009). 
 4. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367. 
 5. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 6. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–10 (2007). 
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guidelines for other offenses, including the child pornography 
guideline.7 But there is disagreement on this issue, and a circuit split 
has developed as to whether judges can lawfully disregard the child 
pornography guideline based on policy differences. 
The Booker/Kimbrough combination has resulted in an increasing 
rate of variances from guidelines-recommended sentences overall, 
but the level of dissension is at its zenith with child pornography 
crimes. As in any debate, there are two sides. On one side are critics 
who contend that the child pornography guideline suffers many 
fundamental flaws, such as the lack of any empirical foundation, the 
failure to represent the Commission’s institutional judgment, and 
disproportionality.8 Because of these flaws, many judges are rejecting 
the child pornography guideline on policy grounds, arguing that it 
produces sentencing ranges that fail to distinguish between more and 
less culpable offenders and generally are reasonable only for the most 
heinous sexual predators.9 On the other side are those who believe 
that child pornography offending is an extremely serious crime 
because children are necessarily being sexually exploited by the 
production and viewing of the material and, as a result, the 
guidelines’ tendency toward very long sentences is justified.10 They 
contend an important reason that the guideline does not entirely 
represent the Commission’s independent work is that Congress has 
expressly directed certain of the child pornography guidelines’ 
contents.11 Such action by Congress is entirely appropriate, it is 
argued, because Congress is representative of the people, it can better 
assess systemic needs for punishment, and it properly holds ultimate 
authority over sentencing judgments.12 
                                                                                                                 
 7. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER 
ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, pt. A, at 37–43 (2012) [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Booker_
Reports/2012_Booker/index.cfm. 
 8. Carol S. Steiker, Lessons From Two Failures: Sentencing for Cocaine and Child Pornography 
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 41–42 
(2013). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 44. 
 11. See United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2009); Steiker, supra note 8, at 44. 
 12. Stone, 575 F.3d at 87. 
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The Commission appears frustrated with both Congress and the 
federal judiciary.13 Child pornography has emerged, in metaphorical 
terms, as the Commission’s Achilles’ heel. In a lengthy, formal 
report to Congress on the state of affairs post-Booker, the 
Commission recently singled out child pornography as the leading 
source of controversy and nonuniformity in federal sentencing.14 At 
the same time, as Congress continues to dictate longer sentences for 
child pornography crimes, district judges are increasingly varying 
below-guideline recommendations.15 In fiscal year 2012, almost one-
third of child pornography sentences were within-guideline range 
while more than half were below-range,16 a situation unique to this 
category of federal crime.17 The Commission bemoans this situation, 
worrying the influence of this particular guideline has become too 
attenuated.18 In its report to Congress, the Commission also 
expressed significant concern about intercircuit disparities, observing 
that circuit courts are reaching different outcomes for similarly 
situated child pornography defendants.19 
The issues raised herein are not limited to the child pornography 
context. Rather, the rhetoric and drama underlying policy and 
constitutional debates about this crime make it distinctly suited as an 
avenue to address larger questions.20 These debates underscore that 
                                                                                                                 
 13. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, at 1, 3–4. 
 14. Id., pt. A, at 73 (noting child pornography sentencing is “markedly different from any other 
offense type” in that the rate of nongovernment-sponsored below-range sentences was higher than 
within-range sentences). 
 15. Id. 
 16. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.27A 
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK], available at www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_ 
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/sbtoc12.htm; see also infra text following Table 2 (18% of which were 
government-sponsored below-guideline departures). 
 17. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, at 91. 
 18. See id., pt. C, at 10–12. 
 19. Id., pt. A, at 79–80, 106 & n.438; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FED. 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES 245 (2013) [hereinafter FED. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES], 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_ 
Reports/Sex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_Pornography_Offenses/index.cfm; accord United 
States v. Rothwell, 847 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1050 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (“An examination of appellate 
decisions reviewing child pornography sentences yield widely disparate results in the outcome and 
reasoning that makes it difficult to discern why in one case a particular result is affirmed and in another 
case with seemingly similar facts the case is reversed.”). 
 20. Steiker, supra note 8, at 28 (contemplating child pornography guideline as emblematic of deeper 
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three strong institutions are waged in a sort of war, each vying for 
dominant power in sentencing federal offenders. The situation also 
offers rich perspectives on the adjudication of sentencing policy, 
including policy nullification, and the potential relevance of 
empirical study. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I outlines basic principles 
underlying the operation of modern federal sentencing.21 Section II 
explores how the debate has engaged public discourses in Congress, 
the federal judiciary, legal publications, and the media.22 It also 
reviews discourses from district judges on the reasons the child 
pornography guideline is fundamentally flawed.23 Section III fleshes 
out a circuit split on the issue of whether, as a matter of law, district 
judges may reject the child pornography guideline for policy-based 
reasons.24 Section III also theorizes the best answer to this issue.25 In 
sum, it submits that the child pornography guideline is, indeed, 
flawed and that not only is a policy rejection reasonable, but also 
precluding district judges from rejecting it would be 
unconstitutional.26 Section IV provides statistical analyses based on 
the Commission’s fiscal year 2011 datasets.27 It provides information 
to explain the length of sentences as well as sentencing variations.28 
The Section also addresses implications from the circuit split for 
inconsistent sentencing outcomes.29 The Article ends with a series of 
conclusions.30 
                                                                                                                 
institutional failures on both internal and normative levels, compounded by resistance to amelioration 
despite reasonable criticism). 
 21. See discussion infra Section I. 
 22. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 23. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 24. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 25. See discussion infra Section III.B.1–2. 
 26. See discussion infra Section III.B.3. 
 27. See discussion infra Section IV. 
 28. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 29. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 30. See discussion infra CONCLUSIONS. 
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I.   SENTENCING BASICS 
For most of the twentieth century, federal sentencing was an 
indeterminate system in which district judges were primarily 
responsible for determining punishment for convicted defendants.31 
Indeterminate sentencing, though, yielded great diversity in sentences 
across the country for similarly situated offenders.32 A concerned 
Congress responded by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
establishing the United States Sentencing Commission.33 Congress 
charged the Commission with promulgating presumptive sentence 
guidelines.34 Commission-instituted guidelines were binding on the 
courts, though a judge was granted limited discretion to depart if 
there was an aggravating or mitigating factor in the case that the 
Commission had not adequately considered when formulating the 
guidelines.35 At the same time, Congress outlined certain factors that 
should be considered in determining a reasonable sentence for a 
convicted defendant.36 These factors, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 
include the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed 
considering the seriousness of the offense, retribution, deterrence, 
and protecting the public; the range set by the sentencing guidelines 
and Commission policy statements; and the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated 
offenders (hereinafter § 3553(a) factors).37 
Despite the guidelines initially being presumptive, the United 
States Supreme Court rendered them advisory in nature in the 2005 
seminal case of United States v. Booker.38 In that case, the Court 
found the federal determinative sentencing system operated in an 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–66 (1989). 
 32. Id. at 366. 
 33. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211–39, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). 
 34. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367. 
 35. Id. This occurs pursuant to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0. 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 37. Id. 
 38. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
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unconstitutional manner.39 Bestowing advisory status was the 
Supreme Court’s remedial fix for the constitutional violation, while it 
also permitted the federal guideline system to at least survive.40 Yet 
the Booker fix did not return to the judiciary the wide discretion that 
existed preguidelines. In a series of cases since then, the Supreme 
Court has reaffirmed that federal judges are significantly 
circumscribed by the Commission’s guidelines and policies, albeit 
guided by the statutory § 3553(a) sentencing factors.41 
Based on Booker and its progeny, the current process of selecting a 
particular punishment generally involves a series of steps. The 
sentencing judge first calculates the base offense level from the 
applicable offense guideline.42 She does this by determining the 
initial base offense level and then making appropriate adjustments 
provided by relevant guidelines to reach a final base offense level.43 
These adjustments are generally facts related to the offense, which 
are called specific offense characteristics, or characteristics related to 
the offender that the Commission perceives as aggravating or 
mitigating culpability.44 Specific offense characteristics for the child 
pornography guideline, for example, include the number of images 
possessed, the nature of the images’ content, the young age of the 
children depicted, and distribution activity.45 Second, the final base 
offense level together with a criminal history score are translated 
through the principle guidelines grid into a sentencing range, such as 
twenty-four to thirty months.46 Third, the judge considers whether 
any of the general departure standards apply, such as use of a 
dangerous weapon or diminished capacity, and, if so, makes a final 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 226–27. The Court ruled that the mandatory sentencing system violated defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights to a jury trial by requiring judges, rather than juries, to make determinations of fact 
that would enhance the punishment for defendants’ crimes. Id. at 244. 
 40. See id. at 245. 
 41. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (2013). 
 42. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.1(a)(1) (2013). 
 43. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(2), 1B1.2. 
 44. See id. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.1. 
 45. Id. § 2G2.2(b). 
 46. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(6)–(8). 
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guideline-sentencing determination.47 Thus, the guidelines provide a 
framework, or starting point, for any sentencing decision.48 
According to the Supreme Court, sentencing ranges of correctly 
calculated guidelines normally provide “a rough approximation of 
sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives” in a mine-run 
case.49 This is because the ranges generally represent decisions by the 
Commission’s “‘professional staff with appropriate expertise’”50 after 
“careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from 
the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions” 
nationwide.51 
However, the Booker remedy means that, while the court must 
give thoughtful consideration to the guidelines, it must also be 
mindful of whether a guidelines-based sentence properly reflects 
§ 3553(a) statutory sentencing factors.52 Thus, the fourth step is for 
the judge to reflect upon these statutory sentencing factors in 
determining whether a within-guideline or, alternatively, a non-
guideline sentence is proper.53 In the final decision, the sentencer sets 
a parsimonious punishment, i.e., one that is “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary” to accomplish the statutory sentencing 
goals.54 
As noted above, one of the presumptions underlying the Supreme 
Court’s respect for the guidelines, and its insistence that they remain 
a benchmark for a proper sentence, concerns the idea that the 
Commission formulates guidelines using its institutional strengths 
and after considering extensive empirical study.55 The Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of whether a judge could reject a 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. §§ 1B1.1(b), 1B1.4, 5K2.0. 
 48. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
 49. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007). “The term ‘mine-run’ deserves to be Googled 
and then forgotten. Think run-of-the-mill.” United States v. Grober (Grober I), 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 403 
& n.12 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 50. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 
1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring), vacated, 552 U.S. 1306 (2008)). 
 51. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 349). 
 52. Rita, 551 U.S. at 351; see also id. at 358 (A sentencer’s reasoned sentencing judgment rests 
“upon an effort to filter the Guidelines’ general advice through § 3553(a)’s list of factors.”). 
 53. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(c) (2013). 
 54. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
 55. Rita, 551 U.S. at 349. 
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Commission-issued guideline if it was not so formulated in the case 
of Kimbrough v. United States.56 The district judge in Kimbrough 
refused to comply with the guideline governing crack cocaine 
offenses because its ranges were based on a 100:1 ratio in which a 
trafficker of crack cocaine was subject to the same sentence as a 
trafficker of 100 times as much of powder cocaine.57 The district 
judge objected to the policy since it created an unwarranted disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine offenders and yielded 
unreasonably high sentences for crack cocaine defendants.58 The 
judge instead issued a sentence that represented a significant 
downward variance from the recommended guideline range.59 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court considered the history of the crack 
cocaine guideline and the 100:1 ratio.60 It determined that the 
Commission had not used its normal empirical approach in 
establishing the ratio.61 Instead, the Commission had simply 
borrowed that same ratio from Congress, which had used it to set 
certain statutory mandatory minimum sentences for crack and 
powder cocaine crimes.62 However, Congress had not explicitly 
ordered relevant guidelines to use that ratio in developing 
incremental ranges between statutory minimums and maximums, and 
the Supreme Court declined to recognize any implicit direction.63 The 
Supreme Court further noted that the Commission had formally 
objected to the 100:1 ratio, arguing that it was not compliant with 
§ 3553(a) objectives because it overstated the degree of higher risk 
for crack cocaine offenders and failed to adequately distinguish 
among culpable offenders.64 In sum, the Kimbrough Court approved 
the ability of a court to vary from the cocaine guideline based on a 
categorical or policy disagreement.65 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 57. Id. at 92–93. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 93. 
 60. Id. at 94–100. 
 61. Id. at 96. 
 62. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 96–97. 
 63. Id. at 102–03. 
 64. See id. at 98–99. 
 65. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 263–64 (2009). 
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Potential ambiguities in the Kimbrough decision have elicited 
debate. A threshold issue is whether the holding applies only to a 
policy disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline.66 If not, then 
two other potential limitations are conceivable. These are whether a 
Kimbrough-type policy objection applies only to a Commission-
inspired policy, as opposed to a policy directed by Congress, or only 
to a guideline not developed with the Commission’s normal 
empirical study.67 These matters are discussed in the sections that 
follow. For now it is important to recognize that many courts have 
utilized a Kimbrough-type policy rejection for other categories of 
crimes outside the context of the crack/powder cocaine genre—
including child pornography—though numerous others disagree.68 
To round out the basics on federal sentencing, a brief reference to 
appellate review is appropriate. There are two main types of appellate 
review: procedural and substantive reasonableness. Procedural errors 
include “failing to calculate . . . the Guidelines range, treating the 
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, 
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 
adequately explain the chosen sentence.”69 If the sentence passes the 
procedural reasonableness test, the appellate court reviews the 
sentence on substantive reasonableness grounds.70 Substantive 
appellate review is based on an abuse of discretion standard, 
regardless of whether the sentence comports with the recommended 
range or is outside, even significantly outside, the guidelines-
computed range.71 
II.   DISCOURSES ON A TROUBLESOME GUIDELINE 
Sentencing is a focal point in the federal system of criminal justice 
adjudication. Since Booker, over ninety-five percent of federal 
                                                                                                                 
 66. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, at 37. 
 67. See id., pt. A, at 37–40. 
 68. See id., pt. A, at 37–41 (collecting cases). 
 69. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 41. 
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defendants sentenced were the result of plea deals,72 meaning that the 
major procedural mechanism from a formal perspective is not trial 
but the sentencing phase. Thus, basic concerns of stakeholders about 
fairness and justice are concentrated on issues involving sentencing 
adjudication. This Section first explores how and why the child 
pornography sentencing guideline has captured the public’s attention. 
Certainly, child sexual exploitation crimes are dramatic and they 
invoke fear and anger. But tensions also run high in discussions about 
overly severe sentences and inconsistencies in punishment. The 
second part of this Section explores judicial discourses on why the 
child pornography guideline is problematic and why it deserves such 
diatribes as it begets, as will be noted herein, even from those judges 
who support it. 
A.   Public Discourses 
One may properly wonder what all the fuss is about—considering 
child pornography offenders are universally reviled. The child 
pornography guideline is of consequence for several reasons. The 
significant rate of variances itself differentiates it from other crimes 
in the federal system.73 There must be something truly unique about 
this guideline that so many judges single it out as deserving of little 
or no respect.74 This situation turns what might otherwise simply be a 
tedious regulatory exercise into a curiosity piece, demanding 
attention to how it has fallen into disrepute with so many learned 
jurists. Before highlighting relevant statistical measures and 
comparisons, it should be noted that this Article addresses 
nonproduction child pornography offenses and their relevant 
guideline, designated within the Commission’s guideline framework 
as § 2G2.2. This guideline generally comprises the noncontact crimes 
of transporting, distributing, receiving, and possessing child 
pornography.75 
                                                                                                                 
 72. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, at 58. 
 73. Id., pt. A, at 67–68, 73. 
 74. See id., pt. A, at 105 & n.436. 
 75. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2013). 
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A few statistical measures illustrate the polemic over time. 
Commission data, widely published and promoted, clearly show a 
steep decline in conformance measures with this particular 
guideline.76 Nationwide, rates of within-guideline sentences in child 
pornography cases have dropped precipitously. In the year before 
Booker, the within-guideline rate was almost 80%.77 After 
Kimbrough, the rate dropped to 41%,78 and it dropped further still in 
fiscal year 2012 to less than 33%.79 While above-range sentences for 
child pornography exist, they are few in number and percentage 
(generally around 1%–3%).80 Instead, the vast majority of outside-
guideline punishments are below-range.81 The percentage of below-
range variances has tracked in the opposite direction from within-
range sentences, representing about 16% of sentences issued in the 
year before Booker to 57% in the years after Kimbrough,82 and was at 
66% in fiscal year 2012.83 
Both guideline minimums and sentence lengths have consistently 
and significantly changed over time as well. For fiscal year 1996, the 
average minimum and actual sentence were both about twenty 
months for child pornography crimes.84 In fiscal year 2012, the 
average minimum was about 129 months while the average actual 
sentence was ninety-eight months.85 Over a sixteen-year period, this 
represents a 545% increase in the average guideline minimum and an 
increase of 390% in actual sentences.86 Comparisons to current 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See generally BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, at 106–45. 
 77. Id. at 114. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 16, at tbl.28. 
 80. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, at 114; see also infra text preceding Figure B (noting 1.5% 
of child pornography sentences were above range in fiscal year 2011). 
 81. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, at 114–45. 
 82. See id., pt. C, at 114. Government-sponsored below- range departures accounted for 4% and 13% 
of cases in the year before Booker and the years after Kimbrough, respectively. Id. 
 83. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 16, at tbl.28. 
 84. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, at 116. 
 85. Data and analyses compiled by the author and on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review. See also Commission Datafiles, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/Research_ 
and_Statistics/Datafiles/index.cfm (data also available upon request from the University of Michigan’s 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ 
icpsrweb/landing.jsp) [hereinafter Commission Datafiles]; 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 16, at tbl.13. 
 86. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, at 116, 177. 
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average sentences for other crimes are enlightening. The ninety-eight 
month mean sentence was exceeded only by the primary offense 
categories of murder (252 months), kidnapping (197 months), and 
sexual abuse (127 months).87 The mean nonproduction child 
pornography sentence is greater than other major crimes, such as 
robbery (77 months), arson (77 months), drug trafficking (68 
months), manslaughter (60 months), and national defense (51 
months).88 It is also notable that the average guideline minimum of 
129 months for child pornography offenses is two months more than 
mean sentences issued for contact sexual abuse crimes, including 
child molestation.89 
Recognition that child pornography crimes play a central role in 
the federal criminal justice system is manifested with the 
controversies they stir in public discourses. Multiple constituencies 
have noticed, expressing various reactions from pragmatism to sheer 
outrage.90 Judges have recognized that the child pornography 
guideline is among the most hotly contested issues within the federal 
judiciary.91 As one jurist astutely observed, the only uncontroversial 
characterization of the situation is that sentencing with the child 
pornography guideline is controversial.92 Another federal judge, who 
is also a former chair of the Sentencing Commission, reflected upon 
his years in both positions, concluding that the child pornography 
guideline is the primary example of judicial concern with the severity 
of a guideline.93 He lamented that it has led to a “tug of war between 
                                                                                                                 
 87. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 16, at tbl.13. The primary offense category of sexual abuse is 
defined to include offenses relating to the “sexual abuse of a minor, transportation of [a] minor for sex, 
sexual abuse of a ward, criminal sexual abuse, and abusive sexual contact.” Id. at app. A. 
 88. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 16, at tbl.13. 
 89. Id. 
 90. United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (N.D. Ohio 2010), aff’d, 669 F.3d 723 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 366 (2012). 
 91. Honorable Thomas M. Hardiman & Richard L. Heppner, Jr., Policy Disagreements with the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines: A Welcome Expansion of Judicial Discretion or the Beginning of 
the End of the Sentencing Guidelines?, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 5, 8 (2012); William K. Sessions III, Federal 
Sentencing Policy: Changes Since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Evolving Role of the 
United States Sentencing Commission, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 85, 99–100 (2012). 
 92. United States v. Rothwell, 847 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (E.D. Tenn. 2012). 
 93. William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26 
J.L. & POL. 305, 305, 321 (2011). 
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the three branches [] with the Sentencing Commission in the 
middle.”94 
Congressmen have publicly called the Commission and the federal 
judiciary to task for the current state of child pornography 
sentencing.95 In a public statement before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 2011, Senator Chuck Grassley excoriated federal 
judges for excessive leniency in sentencing child pornography 
offenders.96 Similarly, in prepared remarks before a House Judiciary 
Committee hearing that same year on the status of federal sentencing 
(the hearing pointedly given the moniker “Uncertain Justice”), 
Congressman James Sensenbrenner began the hearing by vehemently 
objecting to the now advisory status of the federal guidelines—
blaming the Supreme Court for destroying the guidelines—and 
singled out child pornography crimes as the worst example of judicial 
leniency.97 He, only somewhat, facetiously described child 
pornography possessors as being “in luck,” pointing to the fact that 
federal judges are varying downward at the highest rate for that 
offense.98 Congressman Sensenbrenner also expressed concern about 
the consequence of undesirable regional disparities in sentencing.99 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id. at 357. 
 95. S. Comm. on the Judiciary Exec. Business Meeting, 112th Cong. (May 19, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://www.judiciary. 
senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da16cbeb7&wit_id=e655f9e2809e54
76862f735da16cbeb7-0-1. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Six 
Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, 
H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/printers/112th/112-142_70669.pdf. 
 98. Id. at 2. Later in the hearing, a spokesman for the American Bar Association claimed that a child 
pornography possessor was “not in luck to be sentenced today,” referring to the average sentence length 
for child pornography offending as having increased since its inception by 1,500%, “an increase in 
penalties unprecedented in human existence.” Id. at 126 (statement of James E. Felman, Liaison to U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, American Bar Association). 
 99. Id. at 2. Several years before, a Congressman had also expressed concerns specific to child 
pornography sentences. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws—The Issues: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3 
(2007) (statement of J. Randy Forbes, Ranking Member, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & 
Homeland Sec.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg36343/html/CHRG-
110hhrg36343.htm. These included a concern about disparities with nongovernment-sponsored below-
guideline sentences, geographic variations, and significant sentence reductions. Id. 
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As an apparent response to the congressional hearing, the next year 
the Commission issued a lengthy report specifically commenting on 
the child pornography guideline and noting its high variance rate.100 
Legal writers have explored the issue, often holding Congress 
responsible for the inconsistencies.101 One commentator, channeling 
Congressman Sensenbrenner’s imagery of a game of chance, 
analogized the situation to a lightning strike: “[T]he congressionally 
mandated harsh sentences strike some defendants but miss many 
others.”102 In reflecting on the House of Representatives’ Uncertain 
Justice hearing, reporters with the New York Law Journal recognized 
the high rate at which sentencing judges are refusing to follow the 
child pornography guideline, though blaming Congress and its 
extreme micromanagement in forcing “drastic” increases in guideline 
sentences.103 Similarly, a writer in the Boston Bar Journal references 
the conflict between congressional-led increases and the high rate of 
judicial variances as a “controversy rag[ing]” in federal courtrooms 
around the country.104 
The cultural significance of the child pornography sentencing 
debacle is evident as mainstream journalists have reported on it. A 
Morning Edition segment broadcast by National Public Radio (NPR) 
in mid-2012 referred to the question of which player in the federal 
system has the ultimate power in sentencing policy as “one of the 
biggest questions in the criminal justice system” today.105 While the 
discussion began on the broader issue of predictability in federal 
sentencing, the NPR hosts quickly turned to the debate about child 
pornography sentencing and its high departure rate.106 Playing audio 
excerpts from Congressman Sensenbrenner’s comments at the 
Uncertain Justice hearing, the NPR story described the controversy in 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See generally FED. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES, supra note 19. 
 101. See Alan Vinegrad & Jason Levine, Guidelines Gone Awry, N.Y L.J., Nov. 7, 2011, at 3. 
 102. Loren Rigsby, Comment, A Call for Judicial Scrutiny: How Increased Judicial Discretion Has 
Led to Disparity and Unpredictability in Federal Sentencings for Child Pornography, 33 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1319, 1319–20 (2010). 
 103. Vinegrad & Levine, supra note 101, at 1, 3–4. 
 104. Pelgro, supra note 1, at xxviii. 
 105. GOP Seeks Big Changes in Federal Prison Sentences, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/31/146081922/gop-seeks-big-changes-in-federal-prison-sentences. 
 106. Id. 
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quite partisan terms, citing congressional Republicans as being upset 
over federal judges’ leniency on child pornography possessors.107 
The issue was referred to as a “debate” in a New York Times article108 
and a “caustic conflict” in a Boston Globe piece. 109 A news reporter 
in a Denver Post article takes a different stance, expressing confusion 
as to why federal judges would be supporting these particular 
criminals: “In a nationwide series of hearings, members of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission have heard from federal judges seeking 
reduced sentences for a group of defendants one would think unlikely 
to get sympathy from the bench: possessors of child pornography.”110 
At the same time, newspapers have run articles questioning the 
reasons behind disparities in sentences nationwide. A New York 
Times editorial in 2010 noticed the contrasting values.111 On one 
hand, sentences should be consistent, citing the Justice Department’s 
fear that variances indicate arbitrariness and a luck-of-the-draw 
mentality, which could breed disrespect for the federal judiciary. 112 
On the other hand, the editorialist recognized the call by federal 
judges for lower guideline possibilities considering that child 
pornography offenders do not comprise a homogenous grouping: “As 
repellent as child pornography is, it does not help judges when 
someone found with a few photographs is held to similar standards as 
someone disseminating thousands of them.”113 An Associated Press 
story discussed the idiosyncratic consequences and surveys the 
various positions of those engaged in the child pornography 
sentencing debates.114 In a Louisville, Kentucky paper, the 
enterprising reporter compiled years of statistics to compare child 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. 
 108. Erica Goode, Life Sentence for Possession of Child Pornography Spurs Debate over Severity, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2011, at A9. 
 109. Milton J. Valencia, US Judges Balk at Rigid Child Porn Sentences, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2012, 
at A1. 
 110. Felisa Cardona, Federal Judges Argue for Reduced Sentences for Child-Porn Convicts, DENVER 
POST (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_13887009. 
 111. Editorial, Rethinking Criminal Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at A22. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. David Crary, Debate Rages over Child-Porn Sentences, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 29, 2012), 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/29/debate-rages-over-severity-child-porn-sentences/. 
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sexual abuse sentences for defendants in the local state court as 
compared to defendants in the federal district serving the same 
area.115 He wrote, with evident amazement, that the 2006–2011 
average sentence for child pornography offenders in the area’s 
federal district was ten years, an average almost four times longer 
than offenders received in the local court for state charges of sexually 
assaulting children.116 He bemoaned the “mishmash of inconsistent 
penalties.”117 
In sum, the story is perhaps the hottest topic in federal sentencing 
today. It certainly resonates within and outside criminal justice 
circles. Only history will tell if it is the catalyst that leads to the 
demise of the United States Sentencing Commission. For its part, the 
Commission is clearly aware of the debate and the dangers posed.118 
It has defended the creation and evolution of § 2G2.2 in a 2009 report 
on the history of the child pornography guideline (the History 
Report)119 and in its 2012 special report on the state of child 
pornography sentencing.120 But, the Commission also expresses 
frustration that it is being pulled in different directions by Congress 
and the federal judiciary.121 Still, for several years the Commission 
has listed the reconsideration of the child pornography guideline as 
one of its top priorities.122 A complete overhaul would likely be 
welcomed by many, considering the most commonly invoked policy 
complaints from district judges. 
B.   Judicial Policy Discourses 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 attempted to bring 
transparency to federal sentencing by requiring judges to issue a 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Andrew Wolfson, Are Child Porn Laws Unfair? Viewers’ Sentences Can Be Worse than 
Molesters’, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 24, 2012. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, at 1–9, 73, pt. C, at 106–45. 
 119. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 2 (2009) 
[hereinafter CHILD PORN. HISTORY REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_ 
Statistics/Research_Projects/Sex_Offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf. 
 120. See generally FED. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES, supra note 19. 
 121. See id. at 7–54. 
 122. Id. at 1. 
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statement of reasons for imposing the sentence.123 This obligation 
suggests that a judge who rejects the guideline recommendation 
based on a policy choice must articulate the policy at issue and her 
reasons for disagreement.124 A comprehensive review of recent 
federal opinions yields a host of information about the common 
policy-based reasons district judges employ for disregarding the child 
pornography guideline. These objections are discussed below within 
various categories, though it will become clear that there is some 
theoretical overlap among them. 
1.   Rationales 
The child pornography guideline has uniquely elicited a host of 
grievances. As federal judges are not likely to represent child 
pornography apologists, the fact that many have spent time 
attempting to study the background and operation of this guideline 
and the fact that they are willing to risk reversal by rejecting it 
underscore the issue’s significance in the struggle over federal 
sentencing. Nonetheless, it is imperative to stress that these criticisms 
are not shared by all, and the federal judiciary remains divided on 
these issues.125 
a.   Not Empirical 
This type of policy objection derives from Kimbrough’s ideology 
that it might be reasonable for a sentencer to reject a guideline, even 
on the wholesale level, when it is not the result of the Commission’s 
usual empirical research and analysis.126 The Supreme Court’s 
reference to an empirical approach refers to the Commission having 
initially based sentencing recommendations principally upon a 
statistical review of past sentencing practices.127 A sentencing judge 
                                                                                                                 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012). 
 124. See id. 
 125. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Now the Time for Major Federal Sentencing Reform?, 24 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 382, 383 (2012). 
 126. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007). 
 127. Id. at 96–97. 
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offers a helpful explanation for why guidelines that are developed 
through the Commission’s normal institutional role and based upon 
studying empirical data can normally be relied upon.128 Guidelines 
developed properly have descriptive, prescriptive, and normative 
functions.129 By describing sentencing practices across the country, 
they play a prescriptive function in suggesting that a majority of 
sentences should fall within the recommended range because 
sentences within such range reasonably approximate the sentencing 
considerations embodied in § 3553(a).130 Properly derived ranges 
also have a normative role: representing national practices in 
sentencing for similar offenses and offenders, uniformity is 
encouraged, while unwarranted disparity is reduced.131 
Thus, many courts have substantively justified downward 
variances based on their perception that the child pornography 
guideline specifically lacks such empirical support and therefore fails 
to provide appropriate guidance.132 The following general sentiment 
illustrates this genre: “the child pornography Guidelines are . . . not 
grounded in any scientific, statistical, or empirical method. The 
advice imparted in the Guidelines does not reflect the sort of 
empirical data, national experience, and independent expertise that 
characterize the Sentencing Commission’s institutional role.”133 The 
Commission’s own History Report is often cited to support this 
assessment of the nonempirical nature of this guideline, even from its 
initial creation.134 In the History Report, the Commission 
summarized the guideline’s evolution: “Prompted by congressional 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See United States v. Hahn, No. 8:10CR60, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 577, at *9–11 (D. Neb. Jan. 3, 
2011). 
 129. United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 890 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Schinbeckler, No. 1:09-CR-77-TLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112179, 
at *28 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2011); United States v. Cameron, No. 1:09-cr-00024-JAW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24878, at *15–16 (D. Me. Mar. 11, 2011); United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 
1101 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (deflecting prosecution’s argument that § 2G2.2 exemplifies Commission’s 
study since prosecutors provided not “one whit” of evidence of any Commission-led empirical analysis). 
 133. Hahn, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 577, at *31–32. 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Faulhaber, No. 8:11CR320, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *8–10 
(D. Neb. July 31, 2012); United States v. Stark, No. 8:10CR270, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, at *9–
10 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2011); Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1100. 
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action, and on its own initiative, the Commission has reviewed and 
substantively revised the child pornography guidelines nine times.”135 
The inability to locate any evidence of the Commission’s analytical 
study or thoughtful consideration led one court to conclude that there 
appears to be no rationale for the child pornography guideline other 
than a general revulsion for people involved in child sexual 
exploitation.136 
Still, some jurists remain unconvinced that the child pornography 
guideline has no empirical foundations. As an appellate court 
assessed the situation, it was not unreasonable for the lower court to 
conclude there was no national consensus on the child pornography 
guideline’s lack of empirical foundation.137 A district judge in 
another case dismisses the claim that the child pornography guideline 
was unsupported by empirical evidence as simply “not accurate.”138 
Another judge strongly backs the Commission’s role in crafting the 
guidelines: 
[W]hen life gives you lemons, make lemonade. In this instance, 
the Commission was given grandstanding politicians, but still 
crafted proper Guidelines. Rather than cede its responsibility, the 
Commission instead appears to have gone above and beyond to 
justify its amendments. Far from failing to rely on empirical data 
and its own expertise, the Commission has conducted formal 
studies whenever possible and has conducted extensive analyses 
to fulfill its statutory obligations.139 
As previously noted, Congress has directly manipulated this 
guideline; the occurrence of which leads to the second grievance. 
                                                                                                                 
 135. CHILD PORN. HISTORY REPORT, supra note 119, at 2. 
 136. United States v. Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744 (S.D. Iowa 2008). 
 137. See United States v. Psick, 434 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 138. United States v. Muhlenbruch, 682 F.3d 1096, 1102 n.4 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 139. United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851 (N.D. Ohio 2010), aff’d, 669 F.3d 723 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 366 (2012). 
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b.   Congressional Influence 
Several district judges have criticized Congress’s role in directly 
and indirectly influencing the child pornography guideline.140 Some 
of the complaints are rather general, such as assailing the guideline 
for being based on politics rather than being driven by data.141 More 
often, the trouble seems to lie in a sort of separation of powers 
dispute.142 These courts are critical of the fact that Congress has acted 
in an unprecedented manner by requiring, on numerous occasions, 
that the Commission make arithmetical modifications to § 2G2.2. 
These modifications involve increases in the base offense level and 
additional points for specific enhancements.143 By forcing both 
specific offense levels and enhancements on the Commission, these 
congressional directives effectively undermine the Commission’s 
independent formulation,144 and otherwise tie the Commission’s 
hands.145 Courts have asserted that Congress has overridden the 
Commission’s contrary expert judgment,146 even ignoring the 
Commission’s independent attempts to oppose the legislative 
dictates.147 When a prosecutor argued that the congressional 
mandates were not a reason to disregard a guideline, the judge 
caustically summarized the government’s perspective as meaning 
that “the Commission’s institutional role is to do what Congress tells 
it to do to the child pornography guidelines.”148 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See United States v. Stark, No. 8:10CR270, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, at *20 (D. Neb. Feb. 
8, 2011). 
 141. United States v. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (D.N.M. 2012); United States v. Meillier, 
650 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895 (D. Minn. 2009) (concluding guideline driven by politics, not science). 
 142. Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy Nullification” and Other 
Surreal Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 74 (2011). 
 143. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013). 
 144. See United States v. Plachy, No. 4:12CR3049, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65561, at *12 (D. Neb. 
May 8, 2013); United States v. Munoz, Criminal No. 11-167 (JRT/AJB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
155050, at *10 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2012); United States v. Brasfield, No. 11-CR-96, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 96890, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2011). 
 145. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. 
 146. Id. at 1204–05. 
 147. Munoz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155050, at *11–13; United States v. Diaz, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 
1042 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
 148. United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1101 (N.D. Iowa 2009); see also United 
States v. Faulhaber, No. 8:11CR320, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *10 (D. Neb. July 31, 2012) 
(citing CHILD PORN. HISTORY REPORT, supra note 119, at 6, for Commission’s feeling bound to “‘bow 
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Several federal judges have recognized the unique role of 
mandatory minimum sentences in increasing child pornography 
guideline ranges, inasmuch as the Commission strove to avoid ranges 
below applicable mandatory minimums.149 One judge concluded that 
the resulting guideline ranges appear to have been the Commission’s 
attempt to negotiate Congress’s mandatory minimums.150 But while 
such a compromise may make sense practically, the resulting 
guideline does not embody thoughtful research and study.151 Another 
noted that Congress’s ostensible intent in pushing harsher sentences 
was to target those who sexually molest children and those who 
produce child pornography for a profit, yet most federal child 
pornography defendants do not fit in either category.152 Similarly, 
recognizing that the guideline skews toward the most heinous 
offenders, a judge complained it fails to provide appropriate guidance 
for achieving § 3553(a)’s statutory-based objectives in typical cases 
involving noncontact offenders.153 In sum, the position of this 
argument is that deference is unjustified since the child pornography 
guideline is a political construction of Congress forced upon an 
unwitting Commission and transcends the latter’s otherwise 
independent role. 
Other courts, however, find that Congress’s will can and should 
prevail.154 For example, a district court opined that “although the 
guideline range might be harsh, Congress ultimately had the ‘right to 
declare the will of the people’ and to promulgate guideline ranges to 
reflect the appropriate sentence in a particular case.”155 Another jurist 
declined a categorical policy rejection, reflecting that Congress 
clearly intends to punish such crimes harshly and the legislature is 
not required to engage in empirical research to support that 
                                                                                                                 
to the specific directives of Congress’”). 
 149. Faulhaber, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *9 (citing CHILD PORN. HISTORY REPORT, supra 
note 119, at 44–48). 
 150. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1208. 
 151. Id. 
 152. United States v. Stabell, No. 08-CR-244, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28185, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 
19, 2009). 
 153. Faulhaber, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *8. 
 154. United States v. Hardy, 454 F. App’x 132, 134 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 155. United States v. Gillette, 485 F. App’x 416, 418 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
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intention.156 Yet this same thought that the child pornography 
guideline does tend toward harsh punishments is the basis of an 
additional complaint. 
c.   Severity of Recommended Sentences 
Policy-based opposition could conceivably characterize a 
problematic guideline as tending to recommend punishment that is 
perceived as either too heavy or too light. For the child pornography 
guideline, critiques have almost uniformly been in the direction of 
the former.157 Of course, defendants in their own self-interest are 
wont to criticize the guidelines’ recommendations as too high. Yet 
the language used for the child pornography guidelines tends to be 
particularly forthright. For instance, defendants variously describe 
this guideline as “eccentric,”158 “overly punitive,”159 
“overinflated,”160 or “empirically unsupported, vindictive, and 
excessively harsh.”161 Alternative defense claims include that this 
guideline merely represents “‘Congressional hysteria’”162 and the 
Commission’s acting in a “Draconian manner.”163 
District judges have joined the fray, on occasion depicting the 
child pornography guideline as overly harsh,164 draconian and 
extreme,165 or “truly remarkable” in terms of severity.166 A couple of 
                                                                                                                 
 156. United States v. Jager, No. CR 10-1531 JB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21203, at *13 (D.N.M. Feb. 
17, 2011) (conceding the guideline may produce harsh sentences). 
 157. See, e.g., United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 158. United States v. Tanzola, 416 F. App’x 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 159. United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 160. United States v. Black, 670 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 161. United States v. Garthus, 652 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 2373 
(2012); see also United States v. Greenwell, 483 F. App’x 305, 307 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 
(“unduly harsh”). 
 162. United States v. Ilgen, 417 F. App’x 728, 732 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 163. Clogston, 662 F.3d at 591; see also Allen v. United States, Nos. 11 C 8640, 08 CR 238-1, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65107, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2012) (noting defense’s “‘draconian’” reference). 
 164. United States v. Pulsifer, 469 F. App’x 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Price, No. 09-CR-
30107, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38397, at *28 (C.D. Ill. March 21, 2012); United States v. Beiermann, 
599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1101 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 165. United States v. Gillette, 485 F. App’x 416, 422 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also United 
States v. Burns, No. 07 CR 556, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100642, at *40 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009) 
(“duplicative and draconian”). 
 166. Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 383 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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judges wax philosophical. One referred to the guideline’s tendency 
toward extreme punishments as representing a “‘put them down the 
oubliette’ mentality.”167 Another drew on a rather primitive analogy: 
“Am I working with a rational sentencing structure, or administering 
the Code of Hammurabi?”168 
Appellate judges are often also not tame in their explications, 
adjudging the guideline as “very stern,”169 “‘unconscionably 
harsh,’”170 and yielding “unjust and sometimes bizarre results.”171 
Even courts deferring to the guideline have noted the sentences it 
produces can be extraordinarily high and harsh172 or extreme.173 The 
foregoing represents rather generic complaints about harsh 
punishments recommended by the child pornography guideline. 
Nonetheless, judges have explained some of the unfortunate reasons 
this guideline reaches grave levels. 
 i.   Guidelines Recommendations Merge with Statutory 
 Maximums 
A common reproach is that the range produced by the child 
pornography guideline too often is near to or exceeds the statutory 
maximum, even in mine-run cases174 and for first-time offenders.175 
As the following court so cogently expressed, “[t]he crux of the 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. 
 168. Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 384 (referring, too, to defense lawyer’s positing, “[h]ave we gone 
mad?”). 
 169. United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 170. United States v. Overmyer, 663 F.3d 862, 864 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 171. United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 172. United States v. Jager, No. CR 10-1531 JB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21203, at *39 (D.N.M. Feb. 
17, 2011). Even the prosecution in one case conceded the guideline range was “‘extremely harsh,’” 
though still pressed for a sentence at the lower end of the guidelines. United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 
83, 87 (1st Cir. 2009). In another case, a district judge firmly chastised the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 
not imposing upon itself a duty not to consider a guideline-based sentence as presumptively reasonable. 
Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–02. The judge facetiously observed that the prosecutors, in arguing 
sentences before him post-Booker, have virtually never met a downward variance that suited them. Id. at 
1102. 
 173. United States v. Gillette, 485 F. App’x 416, 421 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
 174. United States v. Grober (Grober II), 624 F.3d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Dorvee, 
616 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Faulhaber, No. 8:11CR320, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107262, at *19–20 (D. Neb. July 31, 2012). 
 175. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 186; United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
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critique . . . bears repeating: a series of amendments to § 2G2.2 by 
Congress means that an application of the Guidelines to the ‘average’ 
offender results in a sentence at or close to the statutory maximum, 
i.e., twenty years.”176 The trouble is not just that the 
recommendations huddle around the maximum; it means that the 
guideline effectively ignores statutory minimums. For instance, one 
judge protested that it is illogical for typical guideline 
recommendations to be near the statutory maximum of twenty years 
when Congress had established a broad statutory span between five 
and twenty years for first-time child pornography offenders.177 A 
different judge explained that “[i]f Congress does not want the courts 
to sentence individual defendants throughout that range based on the 
facts and circumstances of each case, then Congress should amend 
the sentencing statute, rather than manipulate the advisory guidelines, 
thereby blunting the effectiveness and reliability of the work of the 
Sentencing Commission.”178 This common occurrence highlights the 
“sheer unhelpfulness of the sentencing ranges for such crimes.”179 
 ii.   The Role of Enhancements 
The instrumental role of multiple enhancements is troublesome 
too. Section 2G2.2 has six categories of enhancements: (1) the 
material involved a minor under twelve or a prepubescent minor; (2) 
the offense involved the use of a computer; (3) the material contained 
violent or sadistic content; (4) a hierarchical series based on the 
number of images; (5) a series based on types of distribution; and (6) 
the defendant has a history of sexual abuse.180 The first four 
                                                                                                                 
 176. United States v. Burns, No. 07 CR 556, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100642, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 
2009) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Stark, No. 8:10CR270, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12500, at *21 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2011) (“In this court’s experience, there is essentially no Internet child 
pornography offender who could end up with a Guidelines-recommended sentence that falls at or close 
to the low end of the statutory range.”). 
 177. United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011 (E.D. Wis. 2008); accord Riley, 655 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1305 (noting irrational recommendation exceeding maximum for first-time, mine-run 
offenders with no criminal history where statutory range of five to twenty years). 
 178. United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004 (S.D. Iowa 2008). 
 179. United States v. Munoz, Criminal No. 11-167 (JRT/AJB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155050, at 
*12–13 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2012). 
 180. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b) (2013). 
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enhancements are almost universally applied,181 while some type of 
distribution enhancement is applied in a majority of cases. The 
following is a credible factual explanation for the commonality of 
such enhancements: 
These sentencing enhancements are almost always applicable 
because the Internet is now the primary vehicle for delivering or 
consuming pornography (legal and illegal) and the number and 
type of images received is frequently accidental; it is thus a poor 
indicator of culpability. Most obviously, this means of 
distribution facilitates the easy collection of a large number of 
images (triggering the enhancement for quantity). Moreover, 
because digital collections are generally built through trading 
images in Internet chat rooms, a defendant generally has very 
little control over the quantity of images he receives or the 
content of those images (triggering enhancements for depictions 
of sadistic sex acts and pictures of children under the age of 
twelve). The predominance of this illicit bartering also means 
that most defendants receive another enhancement for 
distributing images of child pornography.182 
A more concise depiction explained that “the government 
unimaginatively, robotically, and with terrible consequences to this 
defendant, seeks application of ‘aggravating’ factors that in reality 
define the core of the offense—transmitting child pornography by 
file sharing and, on occasion, attaching it to e-mails.”183 A concern is 
that these enhancements unfortunately signify a more passive 
consumer rather than an actual predator.184 
Therefore, judges complain that those common enhancements are 
inherently too flawed to justify lengthier sentences as they apply in 
virtually all cases.185 Still, the problem is not just always about rates. 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Burns, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100642, at *24. 
 182. Id. at *24–25. 
 183. Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 396 (D.N.J. 2008). 
 184. Id. 
 185. United States v. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493 (N.D. Ohio 2012); United States v. Kelly, 
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As one court noted, the high frequency of the enhancements’ 
application is not automatically suspect but is problematic here, 
where they tend to be inherent in the offense itself, and too often 
yield recommendations at or near the statutory maximum, even for 
first-time offenders.186 Enhancements are said to “inordinately 
increase[]” sentencing ranges187 and lead to an “extraordinarily 
punitive result for a first time offender of any crime under the 
guidelines.”188 In addition, the enhancements in the child 
pornography guideline operate in a rather unique manner: in other 
guidelines, enhancements are generally independent of each other, 
whereas “here they are so intertwined that if one applies, the others 
almost invariably apply too and the result is an extremely high total 
offense level for most child pornography defendants.”189 The 
guideline’s recommendation for many offenders, then, violates the 
parsimony clause of the statutory sentencing goals.190 An opinion 
explains this violation further: 
Unlike sentencing enhancements for many other crimes, the 
Commission did not determine that child pornography 
defendants who are subject to typical child pornography 
enhancements, such as use of a computer, are more culpable, 
more dangerous, or in need of a longer prison sentence as a 
deterrent than those defendants who commit the same offense 
                                                                                                                 
868 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1209 (D.N.M. 2012); United States v. Price, No. 09-CR-30107, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38397, at *32 (C.D. Ill. March 21, 2012); United States v. Brasfield, No. 11-CR-96, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 96890, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2011). 
 186. United States v. Schinbeckler, No. 1:09-CR-77-TLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112179, at *13 
(N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2011). 
 187. United States v. Meysenburg, No. 8:08CR361, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82974, at *29 (D. Neb. 
Sept. 11, 2009). 
 188. United States v. Cameron, No. 1:09-cr-00024-JAW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24878, at *9 (D. 
Me. Mar. 11, 2011). 
 189. Id. at *8–9. Importantly, in a recent report the Commission itself admitted that several of the 
enhancements are outdated in terms of no longer differentiating types of offenders and should, with 
congressional approval, be overhauled at some point in the future. FED. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
OFFENSES, supra note 19, at xvii–xviii. Some courts have already embraced this admission as a reason 
to disregard the guideline. United States v. Mallatt, No. 4:13CR3005, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168777, at 
*28–29, 61 (D. Neb. Nov. 27, 2013); United States v. Childs, No. 2:13-cr-96, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
142550, at *5–8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013). 
 190. United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
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without those same enhancements. Therefore, the Guidelines 
range in the typical child pornography case fails to achieve the 
§ 3553(a) objectives.191 
Many often consider the sentencing recommendations not only too 
lengthy but also overly inclusive. 
d.   Unwarranted Similarity 
Many jurists find that the child pornography guideline is too broad 
of an aggregation in combining together quite dissimilar offenses and 
offenders.192 Thus, a frequent complaint is that the guideline fails to 
distinguish the worst from the least,193 or put another way, between 
more and less culpable offenders.194 Pursuant to the guideline, “the 
predator becomes indistinguishable from the voyeur.”195 Yet, instead 
of leaning in the direction of the voyeur, the guideline offers ranges 
appropriate for the far more heinous sexual predator.196 
Instead, judges often believe that palpable gradations of 
egregiousness in these crimes do exist.197 Variations in culpability 
between nonproduction child pornography offense behaviors have, 
therefore, been posited. Examples include judgments that possession 
is less serious than distribution,198 viewing is less serious than 
                                                                                                                 
 191. United States v. Munoz, Criminal No. 11-167 (JRT/AJB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155050, at *11 
(D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2012). 
 192. E.g., United States v. Martin, 469 F. App’x 561, 562 (9th Cir. 2012) (mem.); United States v. 
Faulhaber, No. 8:11CR320, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *19–20 (D. Neb. July 31, 2012); United 
States v. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d 489, 495 (N.D. Ohio 2012); United States v. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d 
1202, 1207 (D.N.M. 2012). 
 193. E.g., Faulhaber, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *19–20; Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1207; 
United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 901–02 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). 
 194. Martin, 469 F. App’x at 562; Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d. at 495; United States v. Price, No. 09-
CR-30107, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38397, at *34 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2012); United States v. 
Schinbeckler, No. 1:09-CR-77-TLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112179, at *13 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2011); 
United States v. Stark, No. 8:10CR270, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, at *21 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2011). 
 195. Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 394 (D.N.J. 2008). 
 196. See United States v. Meysenburg, No. 8:08CR361, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82974, at *29 (D. 
Neb. Sept. 11, 2009). 
 197. Grober II, 624 F.3d 592, 597–98 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 198. United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 760 (6th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012), 
sentence vacated, 720 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Mood, 741 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893 (D. Neb. 2008) (believing a possessor “is 
a marginal player in the overall child exploitation scheme”). 
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creating and facilitating,199 and file sharing is not as serious or 
culpable as large-scale distributing.200 The overly ambitious 
aggregation of dissimilar offenses led to a jurist’s observation that 
§ 2G2.2 is in such a “‘deplorable state’” in failing to adequately 
distinguish between individual offenders that a judge is required to 
engage in the unfortunate exercise “of trying ‘to pound square pegs 
into round holes.’”201 
A sentencer in one case correctly reminded the reader that 
Congress has directed the Commission itself to comply with the same 
§ 3553(a) statutory sentencing goals that are applicable to judges, 
such as proportionality and parsimony.202 The judge asserted that, by 
failing to distinguish based on degrees of culpability, the 
Commission is incapable of fulfilling its mission under such statutory 
obligations.203 The unfortunate over-aggregation of offenders by the 
child pornography guideline has led to another source of asserted 
error: the unintended consequence of inconsistency in punishment. 
e.   Unwarranted Disparities 
A common objection to the child pornography guideline is the idea 
that it has led to widespread disparities in sentencing across the 
country. Thus, courts have varied downward in order to avoid 
unwarranted disparities, as well as to avoid unwarranted similarities 
for offenders engaging in dissimilar conduct.204 The courts engaging 
this critique use several philosophies. For example, contending that 
avoiding disparities suggests a downward variance is appropriate, a 
                                                                                                                 
 199. United States v. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (D.N.M. 2012). 
 200. United States v. Faulhaber, No. 8:11CR320, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *8, *17 (D. Neb. 
July 31, 2012). 
 201. See United States v. Ilgen, 417 F. App’x 728, 734 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding, though, within-
guidelines sentence was just in the instant case). 
 202. See United States v. Schinbeckler, No. 1:09-CR-77-TLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112179, at 
*12–16 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2011). 
 203. See id.; United States v. Plachy, No. 4:12CR3049, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65561, at *11 (D. 
Neb. May 8, 2013) (opining ranges produced by § 2G2.2 fail to approximate § 3553(a) factors). 
 204. E.g., United States v. Munoz, Criminal No. 11-167 (JRT/AJB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155050, 
at *17 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2012); Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1206; United States v. Price, No. 09-CR-
30107, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38397, at *35 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2012); United States v. Stark, No. 
8:10CR270, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, at *26–27 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2011); United States v. 
Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
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court concluded that Congress was concerned with online child 
pornography activity leading to enticing minors and with dangerous 
child abusers—thus, the recommended ranges are inappropriate to 
those who are less culpable and unlikely to try to sexually engage 
minors.205 Courts have cited other decisions with significant 
downward variances206 and the results of a Commission survey of 
federal judges indicating widespread displeasure with the child 
pornography guideline’s severity207 to justify following suit, 
contending doing so would reduce disparities.208 
Others lean in the opposite direction, contending that a problem 
with issuing a non-guideline sentence is that doing so may itself lead 
to disparities in sentences across cases; they justify their own 
variances as likely being in the majority though, citing federal 
statistics indicating that less than half of cases are within-guideline 
ranges.209 
It is possible that judges are not at fault for inconsistencies in 
sentencing nationwide. Instead, the irrationality of the guideline may 
be to blame for any disparity. As one jurist conjectured post-Booker, 
uniformity requires guidelines being reasonable.210 
Once sentencing and appellate judges resolve that the guidelines 
measure the wrong things or result in improper ranges, the 
guidelines lose their persuasive force. The guidelines under 
§ 2G2.2 are at risk of practical irrelevance and defendants will 
increasingly be left to the disparate sense of justice among 
federal judges, which is what led to the guidelines in the first 
                                                                                                                 
 205. United States v. Meysenburg, No. 8:08CR361, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82974, at *31–32 (D. 
Neb. Sept. 11, 2009). 
 206. United States v. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d 489, 496 (N.D. Ohio 2012); United States v. 
Robertson, Criminal No. 2:10-CR-263-DCN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81055, at *3–4 (D.S.C. July 25, 
2011); United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 207. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 490; Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. 
 208. See generally sources cited supra notes 206–07. 
 209. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 491; United States v. Rothwell, 847 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1050 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2012); United States v. Schinbeckler, No. 1:09-CR-77-TLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112179, at 
*27–28 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2011); United States v. Brasfield, No. 11-CR-96, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96890, at *12 n.5 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2011); United States v. Cameron, No. 1:09-cr-00024-JAW, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24878, at *55 n.7 (D. Me. Mar. 11, 2011). 
 210. Cameron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24878, at *55. 
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place.211 
Sentencing is expected to be about proportionality. This applies to 
punishment being reasonably related to the offending behavior as 
well as comparatively proportionate to the punishments assigned to 
other offenses. 
f.   Comparisons to Other Crimes 
In the final category of objection, courts express frustration, even 
incredulity, with the tendency for the child pornography guideline to 
recommend sentences that are similar to, or even longer than, those 
for actual predators.212 For example, a district court decried that the 
“government wants a higher sentence for a man who is not accused 
of, and has never been found to be, an active abuser.”213 In another 
case, the judge noted that “[i]n an instance of troubling irony, an 
individual who, sitting alone, obtained images of sexually exploited 
children on his computer, could receive a higher sentence than the 
Guidelines would recommend for an offender who actually rapes a 
child.”214 One jurist attempted to quantify the difference, 
commenting that the defendant in the instant case “is subject to 
nearly a ten-fold greater punishment for possessing images of 
someone else sexually abusing a minor than he would receive if he 
had committed the actual abuse himself [or for the] horrific crime of 
selling or buying a child for use in the production of pornography.”215 
A similar lament is that, “[i]n effect, the Guidelines presume that 
those who view child pornography are indistinguishable from those 
who actually abuse children.”216 Yet many protesting judges find that 
nonproduction child pornography offenders are far less culpable.217 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 491–92; Cameron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24878, at *10–
11; United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 187 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. 
Supp. 2d 1087, 1106 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 213. Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 396 (D.N.J. 2008) (emphasis in original). 
 214. United States v. Cruikshank, 667 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702 (S.D.W. Va. 2009). 
 215. Cameron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24878, at *10–11. 
 216. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 491–92. 
 217. United States v. Faulhaber, No. 8:11CR320, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *19 (D. Neb. 
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In one case, the government’s argument that consumers need 
extremely severe punishment to deter them from even beginning to 
actually exploit children for sexual purposes was rejected by the 
judge as illogical considering an offender would receive a lesser 
sentence for abusive sexual contact with a minor or statutory rape.218 
It has been surmised that prosecutors may have ulterior motives for 
exploiting the discrepancy. The first motive is evidentiary: 
[T]his Court is frequently presented with plea deals for actual 
sexual assaults of minors, in which the Government agrees to 
less than the five years it adamantly defends for computer 
crimes. Computer crimes are like red light cameras for traffic 
offenses, as they are easily proven with virtually incontrovertible 
evidence, and these crimes have an obvious attraction for 
prosecutors.219 
The second is the use of the child pornography offense as a proxy 
to punish child molestation.220 “The high rate of variances from the 
Guidelines can be explained by the belief that tough sentences in 
these cases are punishing a defendant for something he or she has not 
yet done—and may never do—actual contact with children.”221 The 
government on occasion argues that a high sentence is appropriate 
because of the risk the defendant either had molested or would do so 
                                                                                                                 
July 31, 2012) (noting that downloading, while harmful, is not of equivalent culpability as direct sexual 
molestation or production); United States v. Stark, No. 8:10CR270, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, at 
*20–21 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2011) (downloading not equivalent to production or direct sexual molestation); 
United States v. Meysenburg, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82974, at *26 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2009) 
(distributing not proportional to molestation); Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (downloading 
“manifestly less culpable” than actually abusing children). 
 218. United States v. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1207 (D.N.M. 2012). But see United States v. 
Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 121 (5th Cir. 2011) (disputing argument that child pornography offender should 
not receive the same or more severe sentence than one who had actual sexual contact with a child 
because the former has multiple victims and striking at demand prevents future sexual abuse cases), 
cert. denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 2773 (2012). 
 219. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 n.18; accord Cruikshank, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (“Rarely able to 
catch the monsters that create the images, society reflexively nominates the consumers of this toxic 
material as proxies for the depraved producers and publishers.”). 
 220. See Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. This leads to inappropriately punishing for hypothetical 
behavior. Id. at 1208. 
 221. United States v. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d 489, 491 (N.D. Ohio 2012). 
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in the future.222 In response, the judge in one case proclaimed such a 
factual premise speculative and that basing a guideline’s severity on 
unsupported fears is likely to be unreasonable.223 
Judges are not only concerned with the child pornography 
guideline issuing sentence recommendations that are longer than 
those for contact sexual abuse against children; they also mention 
comparisons to other serious crimes. Courts have asserted that a 
person who views child pornography on the Internet can receive a 
longer sentence than those who commit murder,224 drug trafficking 
crimes,225 assault,226 and bank robbery.227 In sum, the gist of this 
disagreement is that the child pornography guideline recommends 
sentences that are disproportionate within the overall scheme of 
federal crimes. 
The foregoing represents the principle policy objections to the 
child pornography guideline. They are cited by judges to support 
outcomes that purposely are not compliant with the guidelines 
system, but are considered lawful pursuant to Kimbrough.228 
Nevertheless, while some judges blatantly reject the child 
pornography guideline for Kimbrough-type policy reasons, others are 
more reticent, as the following will attest. 
2.   Methods of Policy Rejections 
There are some slightly different linguistic and legal ploys judges 
make when, in the overall context of their opinions, they are in effect 
categorically rejecting the child pornography guideline on policy 
grounds. Many courts forthrightly admit when they vary downward 
                                                                                                                 
 222. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. 
 223. Id. at 1207–08. 
 224. Id.; United States v. Stark, No. 8:10CR270, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, at *28 (D. Neb. Feb. 
8, 2011); United States v. Hahn, No. 8:10CR60, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 577, at *39–40 (D. Neb. Jan. 3, 
2011). 
 225. United States v. Faulhaber, No. 8:11CR320, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *26 (D. Neb. 
July 31, 2012); United States v. Cameron, No. 1:09-cr-00024-JAW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24878, at 
*9–10 (D. Me. Mar. 11, 2011); Stark, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, at *28; Hahn, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 577, at *39–40. 
 226. Stark, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, at *28; Hahn, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 577, at *39–40. 
 227. Cameron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24878, at *9. 
 228. See generally Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
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that they are explicitly rejecting the child pornography guideline 
itself,229 specific guideline enhancements therein,230 or both.231 For 
example, one judge was determined to be very clear: “I find that 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 should be rejected on categorical, policy grounds, 
even in a ‘mine-run’ case, and not simply based on an individualized 
determination that it yields an excessive sentence in a particular 
case.”232 Another chose to disregard those enhancements that either 
were duplicative of the underlying offense or failed to distinguish 
between less culpable offenders.233 Other judges take a less blatant 
approach, agreeing with one or more of the flaws described in 
Section II.B.1 but merely indicating that such deficiencies mean they 
will accord the guideline little deference and thereby vary below the 
recommended sentences.234 Several courts articulated both 
approaches, admitting a policy rejection and giving less deference.235 
In reality, “this distinction may be more semantic than practical.”236 
A few methods of the step-by-step decision are employed. Most 
formally begin with a traditional guideline calculation before 
                                                                                                                 
 229. United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir.) (overruling such rejection on appeal), cert. 
denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012), sentence vacated, 720 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1100 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 230. United States v. Schinbeckler, No. 1:09-CR-77-TLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112179, at *13–14 
(N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2011); United States v. Brasfield, No. 11-CR-96, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96890, at 
*8–9 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2011); United States v. Tapp, No. 1:09-CR-123-TLS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
115051, at *16–17 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2010); United States v. Raby, Criminal Action No. 2:05-cr-
00003, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121836, at *18–19 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 30, 2009); United States v. Burns, 
No. 07 CR 556, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100642, at *25–26 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009). 
 231. See generally sources cited supra notes 229–30. 
 232. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. 
 233. Burns, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100642, at *26. 
 234. United States v. Faulhaber, No. 8:11CR320, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at *19 (D. Neb. 
July 31, 2012); United States v. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d 489, 495 (N.D. Ohio 2012); Brasfield, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96890, at *7; United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2009); 
United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 901 (E.D. Tenn. 2009); United States v. Stabell, No. 
08-CR-244, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28185, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2009). 
 235. E.g., United States v. Munoz, Criminal No. 11-167 (JRT/AJB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155050, 
at *11–13 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2012); United States v. Kelly, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (D.N.M. 2012); 
Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 402 (D.N.J. 2008); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (D. 
Neb. 2008). Other courts seem to lean toward a policy rejection yet officially base their downward 
variance on individualized factors. E.g., United States v. Taylor, No. 1:10CR00011, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9336, at *7–8 (W.D. Va. Feb. 1, 2011); United States v. Mood, 741 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825–26 
(E.D. Mich. 2010); United States v. Meillier, 650 F. Supp. 2d 887, 896–97 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 236. United States v. Abraham, No. 8:12CR384, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69151, at *16 (D. Neb. May 
15, 2013). 
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rejecting it and deciding to vary downward.237 Two judges indicated 
they considered the probation department’s guideline calculation, 
rejected it, and substituted another: one using a calculation consistent 
with the mandatory minimum238 and the other using the 
Commission’s original recommendation.239 
This Section has set forth a variety of assaults on the integrity of 
the child pornography guideline and sometimes speculative 
observations on the roles of Congress and the Commission in crafting 
and modifying the guideline. Many courts have eschewed the 
guideline as being unhelpful and have thereby declined to defer to it, 
even if the defendants being sentenced were within the heartland. As 
a discerning judge put it, “[i]nstead it is truer to say that 
§ 2G2.2 . . . is what falls outside of the heartland.”240 Nevertheless, 
many disagree with such criticism, and, therefore, district courts 
offered disparate opinions on the matter, and case law indicates that 
sentences sometimes appear arbitrary. A significant failure of 
sentencing uniformity across the country is the likely consequence. 
The next relevant matter is to consider the standpoints at the circuit 
court level and, considering there is an evident circuit split, to ferret 
out the most supportable positions on the relevant issues. 
III.   THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A POLICY REJECTION 
The previous Section illustrated the conclusions of a multitude of 
federal district judges who have engaged in fundamental 
disagreements with a particular sentencing guideline. Yet it also 
represented that such positions are not unanimously held. The 
controversy becomes more evident as this Section outlines a circuit 
court division on the constitutionality of rejecting the child 
pornography guideline. After describing the various legal reasoning 
                                                                                                                 
 237. E.g., United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 760 (6th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 423 
(2012), sentence vacated, 720 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2013), Munoz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155050, at *19–
20; Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 402. 
 238. United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1107 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
 239. United States v. Diaz, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
 240. Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 403. 
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underlying the split, the better position on the answer to the issue 
posed is offered and defended. 
A.   Anatomy of a Circuit Court Split 
A case law review of circuit courts of appeals decisions reveals an 
evident circuit court split on the issue of interest.241 As a matter of 
law, may a district court judge categorically reject the child 
pornography guideline based on a Kimbrough-style policy 
disagreement? I have adjudged a three-way split. The first group is in 
the affirmative, the second is in the negative, and the third represents 
a sort of middle approach. The third group is characterized by those 
circuits that have theoretically countenanced the idea that a sentencer 
could disregard the pornography guideline, but the circuits’ opinions 
express skepticism about such a result and otherwise suggest strong 
limitations thereon. The rationales for these differences are often 
oriented around the issues addressed in the previous Section. The 
following discussion utilizes the three-way split as an obvious 
orientation. Nonetheless, sometimes circuits within each grouping do 
not entirely overlap in rationalizing their conclusions. 
1.   Accepting Policy Rejection 
It seems appropriate to start with the groundbreaking circuit level 
opinion that expressly, and vigorously, renounced the relevance of 
the child pornography guideline.242 In the 2010 case of United States 
v. Dorvee, the Second Circuit reversed a twenty year sentence in a 
distribution case as substantively unreasonable for being 
disproportionately long.243 The court first noted the lower court had 
committed reversible procedural error by improperly calculating the 
guideline range: the initially calculated range exceeded the statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 241. Compare United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (accepting policy rejection), with 
United States v. Vanderwerff 459 F. App’x 254 (4th Cir. 2011) (repudiating policy rejection), cert. 
denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 1985 (2012), and United States v. Halliday, 672 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(taking a neutral stance on policy rejection). 
 242. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 181. 
 243. Id. at 176. 
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maximum of twenty years, which pursuant to guidelines’ policy 
made the range the same as the maximum, here being twenty 
years.244 Notwithstanding, the court undertook the extraordinary step 
of addressing an alternative issue, despite the procedural error having 
been sufficient to remand for resentencing on its own merit.245 The 
Dorvee panel considered whether a twenty year sentence for a child 
pornography distribution conviction could even be upheld on 
substantive grounds.246 The court reasoned that ruling on the 
substantive claim was justified, citing the interests of judicial 
economy and the serious flaws it found with the § 2G2.2 guideline.247 
The court also concluded as a matter of law that the sentence was 
substantively unreasonable.248 
The Dorvee court cited three case-specific reasons for determining 
the sentence given was too severe. First, the district court improperly 
assumed the defendant was at high risk of engaging in child 
molestation.249 The appellate court disputed this finding as not 
supported by any factual evidence that Dorvee presented such a 
risk.250 Second, the district judge failed to explain how a sentence at 
the statutory maximum complied with the sentencing goal of 
parsimony.251 Third, the lower court incorrectly presumed a below-
guideline sentence would be upheld as reasonable.252 
The Dorvee decision that the sentence was substantively 
unreasonable did not end with the three foregoing complaints. 
Instead, the court elaborated on the critical flaws in the child 
pornography guideline.253 The decision singled out § 2G2.2 as both 
“fundamentally different” from other guidelines and prone to 
                                                                                                                 
 244. Id. at 181 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(a)). 
 245. Id. at 182. The district court judge had considered the recommended range was higher and 
thought he was giving a below-guideline sentence. Id. As he intended to actually deliver a downward 
variance, his incorrect assumption of the guideline’s range meant the defendant did not get the benefit of 
a sentence that was in reality below the true guideline range. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 182. 
 248. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 183. 
 249. See id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 184. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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unreasonably long sentences.254 The court cited a variety of 
rationales. The Commission’s History Report shows the child 
pornography guideline fails to represent the Commission’s normal 
empirical approach.255 Rather, the increasing length of child 
pornography guideline ranges over time result from congressional 
directives, and as the court asserted, the Commission “often openly 
opposed.”256 As an example, legislative advances of multiple 
enhancements—applicable in virtually all cases—increase base 
offense levels so dramatically that they tend to yield ranges that are 
near to or over statutory maximums, even in mine-run cases.257 The 
court complained this flaw means the guidelines fail to distinguish 
between more and less culpable offenders.258 In addition, the court 
noted another consequence of aggregating virtually all offenders with 
similar ranges and statutory maximums undermines § 3553(a)’s 
foundation that sentencing judges should consider the particular 
nature and circumstances of the offense and individualized 
characteristics of the offender.259 The Dorvee court recognized an 
alternative proportionality problem: these guidelines yield 
recommendations that are irrational and disproportionate whereby a 
typical child pornography defendant would have a lower 
recommended range if he had direct sexual contact with a minor.260 
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit in Dorvee cited 
Kimbrough and the foregoing analyses to justify a downward 
variance from the child pornography guideline.261 And it did so, not 
just based on the individualized circumstances of the instant case, but 
based on its own policy disagreement about the application of the 
guidelines to a whole class of offenders and offenses, such as 
nonproduction child pornography crimes.262 Broadening the scope, 
                                                                                                                 
 254. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 185. 
 257. Id. at 186. 
 258. Id. at 187. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184. 
 261. See id. at 188. 
 262. Id. 
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the court exhorted district courts everywhere to “take seriously the 
broad discretion they possess in fashioning sentences under 
§ 2G2.2 . . . bearing in mind that they are dealing with an eccentric 
Guideline of highly unusual provenance which, unless carefully 
applied, can easily generate unreasonable results.”263 Indeed, the 
lower court in the instant case evidently heeded such advice on 
remand, halving the original term of imprisonment by resentencing 
Dorvee to just over ten years.264 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Dorvee is unusual in two other 
respects. The first is jurisdictional. Post-Booker, the district court 
typically has the discretionary ability to vary from the guideline 
range, with the appellate court merely reviewing such variance with a 
deferential, abuse of discretion standard.265 Here, the district court 
issued what was—in reality—a within-guidelines sentence, yet it is 
the Second Circuit itself that rejected the guidelines based on a 
categorical policy disagreement.266 The other curiosity is that the 
defendant in the case was not a very sympathetic one. The typical 
federal child pornography defendant is a first-time offender who 
passively downloaded illegal images.267 In contrast, Dorvee also pled 
to a state charge of attempting to use a minor in a sexual 
performance, and the prosecution offered additional evidence of 
online solicitation of minor boys, attempts to transmit child 
pornography to them, and attempts to meet them for sexual 
activity.268 
In any event, a later Second Circuit decision confirmed the nature 
of Dorvee’s policy ruling: district judges may deviate from § 2G2.2 
based on a categorical disagreement and without having to show that 
the individual defendant had unique personal characteristics that 
differentiated him from other defendants who had committed the 
                                                                                                                 
 263. Id. 
 264. United States v. Shay, 434 F. App’x 1, 1 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d, 478 F. App’x 713 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
 265. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 188. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. at 186. 
 268. Id. at 176. 
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same crime.269 Indeed, the panel held that it would be plain error for 
a district judge to presume that Kimbrough did not permit a policy 
disagreement applicable to a wide class of offenders.270 The decree 
from Dorvee has significantly impacted sentencing in the Second 
Circuit. Several district courts within the Second Circuit have varied 
downward, citing Dorvee, and have subsequently been affirmed on 
appeal.271 
In sum, Dorvee took a strident tone in criticizing the child 
pornography guideline and has clearly influenced district judges.272 
However, subsequent Second Circuit opinions have scaled back some 
of the potential that defendants thought the case may yield.273 
Defendants within the circuit have thereafter cited Dorvee in arguing 
that their already below-guidelines sentences were still substantively 
unreasonable as the variances ought to have been greater.274 These 
claims are generally rejected on appeal.275 For example, a below-
guidelines sentence was affirmed where the lower court, consistent 
with Dorvee’s pronouncement, applied the guidelines with great care, 
and the sentencing judge did not assume the defendant would 
sexually assault a child.276 A different case affirmed a below-
guidelines sentence as not unreasonable for not varying even 
further.277 In DeLong, the appellate court conceded that, 
notwithstanding Dorvee, a sentence of sixteen years for receipt of 
child pornography was still within the realm of permissible 
decisions.278 
Because the Dorvee appellate court acted on its own in this regard, 
it was an open issue as to whether the ruling meant that district courts 
                                                                                                                 
 269. United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 270. Id. 
 271. E.g., United States v. Alhakk, 505 F. App’x 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Forbes, 465 
F. App’x 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Chow, 441 F. App’x 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 272. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, No. 12-2302, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 8595, at *3 (2d Cir. 
Apr. 29, 2013) (affirming downward variance with sentencing judge’s consideration of Dorvee despite 
evidence defendant molested minor daughter). 
 273. E.g., Forbes, 465 F. App’x at 79–80; Chow, 441 F. App’x at 45. 
 274. E.g., Forbes, 465 F. App’x at 79–80; Chow, 441 F. App’x at 45. 
 275. Forbes, 465 F. App’x at 81; Chow, 441 F. App’x at 45. 
 276. United States v. Henchey, 443 F. App’x 617, 619 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 277. United States v. DeLong, 486 F. App’x 945, 947 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 278. Id. 
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within the Second Circuit were required—or at least normatively 
expected—to essentially disregard § 2G2.2. Later panels have 
deflected broad legal claims about the scope of the Dorvee 
rejection.279 A panel of the Second Circuit disavowed the argument 
that Dorvee necessarily means that a district court commits 
procedural error if it first calculates the guideline range using 
§ 2G2.2 and its enhancements before considering a variance.280 Nor 
does Dorvee impose a heightened standard to justify the application 
of § 2G2.2 enhancements.281 Instead, the panel conceptualized 
Dorvee, from a procedural prospective, as approving a district court’s 
initial calculation of the guideline range and its enhancements, 
despite the guideline’s flaws, as long as the court then considers its 
discretionary ability to vary from the guideline range.282 Regarding 
the substantive reasonableness prong, the same panel referred to 
Dorvee as merely admonishing sentencing justices “against 
mechanically sentencing child pornography defendants within 
Guidelines ranges prescribed by § 2G2.2.”283 Similarly, a separate 
Second Circuit panel described Dorvee as merely having “suggested” 
the child pornography guideline may not deserve the usual deference 
because of empirical problems.284 
In general, it appears that district courts in the Second Circuit have 
not interpreted Dorvee as requiring that they reject or give little 
deference to § 2G2.2. Several district judges within the Second 
Circuit have expressly considered the flaws specified in the Dorvee 
decision but have declined to vary from § 2G2.2, and the resulting 
within-guidelines sentences have been affirmed on appeal.285 For 
example, the district court judge in one case indicated he actually 
                                                                                                                 
 279. See, e.g., United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 226 (2nd Cir. 2013); Chow, 441 F. App’x at 
45–46; United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 280. Chow, 441 F. App’x at 45. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 46. 
 284. Tutty, 612 F.3d at 132. 
 285. See, e.g., United States v. Shay, 478 F. App’x 713, 714 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Magner, 
455 F. App’x 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 518 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied, 2013 WL 4028656 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 13-5685). 
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agrees with the lengthy guideline sentence calculations as “‘each one 
of these children [is a] victim[] and scarred for life.’”286 
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit’s strong denouncement of the 
child pornography guideline as substantially flawed has had 
significant impact on other courts.287 Much of Dorvee’s analysis and 
conclusions were adopted shortly thereafter by the Third Circuit in a 
decision published in late 2010.288 In the case of United States v. 
Grober (Grober II), the Third Circuit approved a policy disagreement 
with the child pornography guideline.289 But unlike the Second 
Circuit in Dorvee that itself adopted the policy rejection, the Third 
Circuit affirmed the district judge’s own policy rejection.290 The 
lower court in Grober I determined that a guidelines-based sentence 
would result in an “‘outrageously high’” sentence and a “‘truly 
remarkable punishment.’”291 The calculated guideline range was 
235–293 months.292 The sentencing court issued a sentence of sixty 
months, representing the mandatory minimum.293 It was barely a 
quarter of the lower end of the guideline range. The government 
appealed the sentence.294 The Third Circuit affirmed, though, 
indicating respect for the lower court’s rigorous consideration of the 
guideline.295 
Determined to take a long and hard look at the child 
pornography Guidelines in an effort to understand why Congress 
and the Sentencing Commission did what they did and whether it 
made sense both as an objective matter and as to the defendant, 
                                                                                                                 
 286. United States v. Gouse, 468 F. App’x 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 287. E.g., Grober II, 624 F.3d 592, 603 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 288. See generally id. 
 289. Id. at 611. 
 290. Id. at 603. 
 291. Id. at 595. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Grober II, 624 F.3d at 596, 612. 
 294. Id. at 599. Interestingly, the government did not challenge the sentence as substantively 
unreasonable. Id. Instead, it argued the case on procedural grounds, contending that the judge had not 
adequately addressed the prosecutor’s arguments before rejecting the guideline. Id. Nonetheless, the 
basis of appeal did not prove relevant to the appellate court’s analysis of the policy rejection issue. See 
id at 599–611. 
 295. Id. at 611. 
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the Court embarked on a careful study of how the Guidelines 
range urged on it by the government came to be. It took evidence 
over twelve days, heard extensive oral argument and considered 
extensive written submissions, and rendered a lengthy oral 
opinion at sentencing and a forty-six page written opinion 
thereafter explaining in great detail how it arrived at what it 
believed to be the correct sentence for this defendant. All of this 
is to be much admired.296 
Notably, the district judge had, in a rather unprecedented move, 
urged the government to produce an official to represent the 
Sentencing Commission as a witness in the lengthy proceedings.297 
But, in a letter declining the invitation to appear, the Commission’s 
representative contended that it was inappropriate for courts to focus 
on the body’s deliberative process; courts should rely only upon the 
Commission’s official releases, such as guidelines, policy statements, 
and official commentary.298 This response suggests the Sentencing 
Commission may have trouble with the judiciary’s Kimbrough-like 
attempt to investigate the institutional process of creating specific 
guidelines. 
Grober II accepts the proposition that Kimbrough permits district 
judges to vary based on a policy disagreement even when a guideline 
is a direct reflection of congressional directive.299 It especially 
countenanced a policy rejection of any guideline that fails to 
“‘exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic 
institutional role.’”300 Such a failure, the court asserted, accurately 
describes the situation with the child pornography guideline.301 
Indeed, the role of Congress in this guideline was not seen as a 
reason to defer. Instead, the Grober II court asserted that a sentencing 
court’s policy rejection despite congressional involvement means 
                                                                                                                 
 296. Id. at 595. 
 297. Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 389 (D.N.J. 2008). 
 298. Id. at 413. 
 299. Grober II, 624 F.3d at 608. 
 300. Id. at 600–01 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)). 
 301. Id. at 601. 
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such a policy rejection is, actually, on even firmer ground given “the 
wealth of resources that have become available” to guide child 
pornography sentencing.302 
The Grober II court clearly stated, however, that the decision is 
not meant as precedent that § 2G2.2 will always yield an 
unreasonable recommendation.303 Consequently, Third Circuit 
decisions since Grober II reiterate that the decision does not require 
that district courts have a policy disagreement with § 2G2.2,304 nor 
that the child pornography guideline always merits less deference.305 
The Ninth Circuit has expressly acknowledged that the child 
pornography guideline suffers numerous flaws and thereby qualifies 
as a matter of law for policy nullification.306 In the 2011 case styled 
United States v. Henderson, the court reviewed the history of the 
child pornography guideline, including the Commission’s History 
Report, and concluded that the guideline was repeatedly ratcheted 
higher as a result of congressional agendas, rather than deriving from 
the Commission’s own independent study.307 The Henderson court 
concluded that, similar to the crack cocaine guidelines addressed in 
Kimbrough, the child pornography guideline is not the subject of the 
Commission’s characteristic institutional role and, therefore, 
sentencing courts have the same ability to bypass it on policy 
grounds.308 The court further emphasized the policy disagreement 
could be on a wholesale level, not just on the retail end—meaning 
that a sentencing judge need not rely on the specific circumstances of 
the offender to justify its rejection.309 In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged the potential circuit split, noting it joined the Second 
                                                                                                                 
 302. Id. at 608–09. A dissenting judge disagreed. The dissent questioned the legitimacy of applying a 
Kimbrough-based policy disagreement to § 2G2.2 since he viewed the crack/powder cocaine ratio issue 
as sui generis. Id. at 613 n.2 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (noting also that, even if Kimbrough was 
applicable, a court should not reject a guideline outright but consider each part on its own). 
 303. Id. at 609. 
 304. United States v. Greene, No. 11-3992, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10156, at *4 (3d Cir. May 21, 
2012); United States v. Hardy, 454 F. App’x 132, 134 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Tanzola, 416 F. 
App’x 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 305. United States v. Sheridan, 503 F. App’x 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 306. See United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 307. Id. at 960–62. 
 308. Id. at 960. 
 309. Id. at 963. 
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and Third Circuits (referring to Dorvee and Grober II respectively), 
despite the existence at the time of a contrary opinion by the Eleventh 
Circuit.310 
Consistent with the other circuits that approve a policy rejection 
for child pornography sentencing, Ninth Circuit opinions are clear 
that sentencing courts are not required to have a policy 
disagreement.311 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has since declined to 
presume within-guidelines sentences are substantively 
unreasonable.312 And it has so demurred, even conceding that a 
within-guideline sentence creates disparities because other sentencing 
judges will vary below for policy reasons.313 
To reach a total of four appellate courts clearly supporting a policy 
disagreement with the child pornography guideline, the First Circuit 
has weighed in on the issue.314 The First Circuit has not yet directly 
affirmed or reversed a rejection on policy grounds, yet it is included 
in this group because it has offered its potential perspective in dicta 
in a 2009 opinion.315 The case involved the defendant’s appeal of a 
17.5 year, within-guideline sentence for transmitting child 
pornography to an undercover agent posing as a child. 316 The district 
judge disagreed with the argument that the guideline was flawed, 
stating “the fact that the guidelines are a direct reflection of a 
congressional expression of popular will is an argument in favor, not 
against the imposition of a guideline sentence. Congress is, after all, 
the elected representatives of the people of this country . . . .”317 On 
appeal, the First Circuit first recognized that a sentencing judge may, 
based on Kimbrough, have a policy disagreement with a guideline 
even when the guideline provision is a direct reflection of a 
                                                                                                                 
 310. Id. at 963 n.4 (citing United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1201 n.15 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
 311. E.g., United States v. Frantz, 485 F. App’x 890, 891 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Shigley, 
451 F. App’x 705, 705 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Psick, 434 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 312. Frantz, 485 F. App’x at 891; United States v. Self, 492 F. App’x 762, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 313. E.g., Frantz, 485 F. App’x at 891; Self, 492 F. App’x at 765; Shigley, 451 F. App’x at 705–06. 
The court has affirmed an above-guidelines sentence of twenty years for receipt where the defendant 
had a history of child molestation. United States v. Claassen, 475 F. App’x 255, 255 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 314. United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 315. Id. at 89. 
 316. Id. at 85–87. 
 317. Id. at 87. 
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congressional directive.318 On the other hand, the appellate court 
explained that the mere fact a guideline may have been influenced by 
congressional initiative does not necessarily mean a sentencing court 
may not rely upon it.319 The First Circuit also acknowledged the 
unfortunate consequence of a substantially different sentence 
depending on the particular judge handling the case: 
After Kimbrough, the law allows one judge to find that 
congressional input makes a sentence less empirical, and so less 
appropriate, while another judge may reasonably find such input 
makes the sentence more reflective of democratic judgments of 
culpability, and so more reasonable. Kimbrough itself 
specifically acknowledged the disparity the broad discretion it 
confers would create.320 
In the end, the First Circuit affirmed the within-guidelines sentence 
because the district judge clearly was aware of his ability to vary yet 
simply had no policy disagreement.321 Notably, the appellate court 
added a “coda” about its likely stance on the policy issue: 
[W]e wish to express our view that the sentencing guidelines at 
issue are in our judgment harsher than necessary . . . [F]irst-
offender sentences of this duration are usually reserved for 
crimes of violence and the like. Were we collectively sitting as 
the district court, we would have used our Kimbrough power to 
impose a somewhat lower sentence.322 
Since then, the First Circuit has affirmed that it read Kimbrough as 
having “made pellucid a sentencing court’s authority to deviate from 
a properly calculated [range] because of a particularized 
disagreement with the Sentencing Commission’s policy 
                                                                                                                 
 318. Id. at 89. 
 319. Id. at 93. 
 320. Stone, 575 F.3d at 93. 
 321. Id. at 92. 
 322. Id. at 97. 
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judgments.”323 Yet, when given another opportunity,324 it again 
declined to overturn a sentence for its own policy reasons, despite 
referring to guideline recommended sentences for child pornography 
offending as “very stern.”325 The directly contrasting perspective on 
the issue at hand is considered next. 
2.   Repudiating Policy Rejection 
In contrast to the four circuit courts of appeals (First, Second, 
Third, and Ninth) that have definitively approved the ability to 
categorically refute the child pornography guideline, another four 
circuits have taken the opposite stance.326 The four circuits on the 
other side of the split include the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits.327 These latter circuits generally have acknowledged the 
circuit split, with references to the contrary appellate critiques 
ranging from polite disagreement to more blatant disavowal.328 These 
courts are more deferential to Congress and, to a lesser extent, work 
by the Commission.329 
Collegiality best represents the Fourth Circuit’s discussions. In a 
late 2011 opinion, the Fourth Circuit was confronted with a case in 
which the defendant was sentenced to the statutory maximum of ten 
years, which qualified as a within-guideline sentence.330 The 
defendant emphasized the Second Circuit’s Dorvee criticism to 
support his claim of substantive unreasonableness.331 The Fourth 
Circuit issued a cogent response: “We acknowledge [defendant’s] 
                                                                                                                 
 323. United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 591 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 324. See id. at 593. 
 325. Id. 
 326. See, e.g., United States v. Knight, 496 F. App’x 969, 971 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012); United States v. 
Vanderwerff, 459 F. App’x 254, 254–55 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 1985 (2012); 
United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 2773 (2012). 
 327. See, e.g., Knight, 496 F. App’x at 971; Bistline, 665 F.3d at 761; Vanderwerff, 459 F. App’x at 
254–55; Miller, 665 F.3d at 119. 
 328. See, e.g., Knight, 496 F. App’x at 971; Bistline, 665 F.3d at 761; Vanderwerff, 459 F. App’x at 
254–55; Miller, 665 F.3d at 119. 
 329. See, e.g., Knight, 496 F. App’x at 971; Bistline, 665 F.3d at 761; Vanderwerff, 459 F. App’x at 
254–55; Miller, 665 F.3d at 119. 
 330. Vanderwerff, 459 F. App’x at 254. 
 331. Id. at 255. 
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heavy reliance on the Second Circuit” in Dorvee in critiquing the 
child pornography guidelines, but “[w]e are not persuaded that the 
approach taken in that case compels us to disturb the district court’s 
sentence here.”332 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in that case thought the 
issue did not even rise to the level of requiring oral argument.333 The 
court has since summarily affirmed within-guidelines sentences.334 In 
one case, it signaled its pro-guideline stance when commenting that 
“‘district courts, in the course of selecting an appropriate sentence, 
ought to give respectful attention to Congress’ view that child 
pornography crimes are serious offenses deserving serious 
sanctions.’”335 
The Fifth Circuit, when first confronted with defendants 
challenging their within-336 or above-guideline337 sentences based on 
Dorvee, initially rebuffed them, simply asserting that, as an appellate 
court, it declined to second guess a sentencing court’s position 
regarding an empirical issue with any guideline.338 In an opinion 
issued in late 2011, however, the Fifth Circuit directly confronted the 
issue.339 In United States v. Miller, the Fifth Circuit outright opposed 
the Second Circuit’s Dorvee decision: 
With great respect, we do not agree with our sister court’s 
reasoning. Our circuit has not followed the course that the 
Second Circuit has charted with respect to sentencing Guidelines 
that are not based on empirical data. Empirically based or not, 
the Guidelines remain the Guidelines. It is for the Commission to 
alter or amend them. . . . [W]e will not reject a Guidelines 
provision as “unreasonable” or “irrational” simply because it is 
                                                                                                                 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. United States v. Silcox, 474 F. App’x 1000, 1001 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. DeBolt, 444 
F. App’x 714, 716 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 335. DeBolt, 444 F. App’x at 716 (quoting United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 350 (4th Cir. 
2010)). 
 336. United States v. Verma, 455 F. App’x 462, 464 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 337. United States v. Abbate, 435 F. App’x 326, 327 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 338. Verma, 455 F. App’x at 463; Abbate, 435 F. App’x at 327. 
 339. United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 120–21 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 
2773 (2012). 
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not based on empirical data and even if it leads to some 
disparities in sentencing.340 
The Fifth Circuit suggested that sentencing uniformity is not a 
dispositive consideration. Acknowledging Commission statistics 
showing a high rate of below-guidelines sentences for child 
pornography crimes, it commented that “[w]hile sentences imposed 
by other courts may be a consideration for a district court, such 
information does not set a median, floor, or ceiling.”341 The court 
took further issue with the ideology of empirical-based sentencing. It 
asserted that neither appellate courts nor district courts are obligated 
to use statistical analyses to determine a reasonable sentence.342 The 
Fifth Circuit declared it adheres to a rebuttable presumption that a 
guideline sentence is reasonable even if it is not empirically based or 
leads to sentencing disparities.343 
Miller then became known as a precedent-setting opinion within 
its jurisdictional reach. The Fifth Circuit’s position is to firmly veto 
the argument that § 2G2.2 is legally subject to policy rejection.344 To 
date there does not appear to be a decision in which the Fifth Circuit 
has affirmed a below-guideline child pornography sentence based on 
a policy disagreement.345 
The Sixth Circuit has, in recent years, taken somewhat conflicting 
approaches to the child pornography guideline. On one hand, it has at 
least theoretically contemplated that a sentencing court may reject 
§ 2G2.2346 or its enhancements347 for policy reasons. On the other 
                                                                                                                 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 122. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 121; see also United States v. D’Binion, No. 12-50551, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9745, at *3 
(5th Cir. May 15, 2013). 
 344. E.g., United States v. Sherley, 480 F. App’x 336, 337 (5th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 
625 (2012); United States v. Rios, 477 F. App’x 209, 211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 804 
(2012); United States v. Gerholdt, 460 F. App’x 430, 431 (5th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 2790 
(2012). 
 345. Prior to Miller, the Fifth Circuit affirmed probationary sentences in child pornography cases 
based on the deferential standard of review. United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Rowan, 530 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 346. United States v. Hammonds, 468 F. App’x 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Phillips, 
455 F. App’x 624, 625 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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hand, the Sixth Circuit has appreciably limited policy rejections in 
several ways. First, it contends that a sentencing court does not 
commit procedural error by declining even to consider whether a 
guideline should be rejected on the basis of not deriving from the 
Commission’s empirical expertise.348 The court explained that 
requiring such consideration would solicit an exercise that would 
unnecessarily distract the court from focusing on the defendant’s 
conduct to conducting a historical review of the guideline in 
question.349 
A second limitation exists as the Sixth Circuit seemingly would 
strictly curtail the reasons upon which a sentencing court may base a 
policy rejection. Similar to the analyses by the Second and Third 
Circuits in Dorvee and Grober II, respectively, the Sixth Circuit itself 
conducted a historical review of the increasingly severe child 
pornography guideline.350 But the Sixth Circuit came to the opposite 
conclusion.351 Instead of Congress’s involvement being a reason to 
spurn guideline recommendations, this circuit views congressional 
mandates as enhancing deference given Congress’s constitutional 
prerogative to issue sentencing edicts.352 It views Congress as 
enjoying ultimate authority for federal sentencing policy, with the 
Commission being obliged to implement congressional directives 
even in child pornography cases.353 
Placing the Sixth Circuit in the anti-rejection group becomes clear 
after the 2012 decision in United States v. Bistline.354 There, a Sixth 
Circuit panel explained that, because Congress has the preeminent 
authority to set sentencing policy, rejecting § 2G2.2 for being 
                                                                                                                 
 347. United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 733 (6th Cir.), cert denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 366 
(2012). 
 348. Hammonds, 468 F. App’x at 598–99; United States v. Schimley, 467 F. App’x 482, 485 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 349. Hammonds, 468 F. App’x at 598; see also Schimley, 467 F. App’x at 486. 
 350. United States v. McNerney, 636 F.3d 772, 775–78 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 351. Id. at 778. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012), 
sentence vacated, 720 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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influenced by Congress is legally impermissible.355 “[T]he fact of 
Congress’s role in amending a guideline is not itself a valid reason to 
disagree with the guideline.”356 The court similarly argued that 
criticizing § 2G2.2 as politically motivated is equally untenable.357 
The court then proceeded to compare the child pornography and 
cocaine guidelines on this issue: unlike the 100:1 ratio in Kimbrough, 
which “the Commission had simply lifted the ratio off the rack of 
another, inapposite statutory provision,” the § 2G2.2 guideline is 
largely based on Congress’s own judgments. 358 Indeed, the Bistline 
court described § 2G2.2 as driven by Congress’s empirical 
approach—though in context it appears the court actually meant a 
deterrence orientation—and by Congress’s retributive value 
conclusions.359 The appellate court chided the lower court for not 
having even attempted to refute Congress’s judgments.360 In the end, 
the Bistline court overruled the district court’s policy rejection of 
§ 2G2.2 and, after also finding the sentence to be overly lenient, 
vacated the below-guidelines sentence.361 
Shortly after Bistline was rendered, another Sixth Circuit panel 
cited it in a relatively rare case of the government challenging on 
appeal a sentence as unreasonably low.362 In that case, though, the 
sentencing judge had not expressly disagreed with the sentencing 
guidelines, but instead gave a seventy-eight month downward 
                                                                                                                 
 355. Id. at 762. “‘In our system, so far at least as concerns the federal powers, defining crimes and 
fixing penalties are legislative . . . functions.’” Id. at 761 (quoting United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 
486 (1948)). 
 356. Id. at 762; see also United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A] 
district court could not refuse to apply § 2G2.2 if the district court’s basis for its disagreement was the 
fact that Congress adopted the § 2G2.2 enhancements directly instead of in accordance with its usual 
practice of allowing the Sentencing Commission to formulate Guidelines.”) (citing Bistline, 665 F.3d at 
761), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 366 (2012). 
 357. Bistline, 665 F.3d at 762. 
 358. Id. at 763. 
 359. Id. at 764. “Congress’[s] child pornography legislation initiatives have been unambiguously 
motivated by a desire to cast a wider criminal net, and impose harsher punishments for child 
pornography offenses.” United States v. McNerney, 636 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 360. Bistline, 665 F.3d at 764. 
 361. Id. at 768. 
 362. United States v. Robinson, 669 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 929 
(2013). 
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variance based principally on the characteristics of the defendant.363 
The appellate court overturned the sentence, criticizing the 
sentencing judge for not adequately considering those sentencing 
factors that refer to the seriousness of the offense, need for 
deterrence, and sentencing disparities.364 
Yet at least one justice on the Sixth Circuit evidently does not 
agree with his brethren: “The problem in this pornography case is the 
gross disparity, inequality, and unfairness that exists in sentencing 
generally, but even more so in these child pornography viewer cases. 
It illustrates the continued sad dependence of federal judges on a 
harsh sentencing grid created by a distant bureaucracy.”365 The 
dissenter praised the Third Circuit in Grober II, for having 
“performed a real service to the federal judiciary; and we should 
follow their example.”366 He further complained that the majority 
ignored the multiple flaws and the criticisms by other judges and 
academic writers, but instead they were convinced the sentence was 
reasonable if the judge and grid agreed.367 “The grid becomes a 
biblical command for the reviewing judges.”368 
The Eleventh Circuit is perhaps the first appellate court to have 
dismissed the argument that sentencing judges could disregard 
§ 2G2.2, though its analysis is rather minimal in this regard.369 In the 
2008 case United States v. Pugh, the court found that the child 
pornography guideline does “not exhibit the deficiencies the Supreme 
Court identified in Kimbrough.”370 In contrasting the child 
pornography guideline with Kimbrough and the cocaine guidelines, 
the Eleventh Circuit opinion concisely identified two distinguishing 
                                                                                                                 
 363. Id. at 775. 
 364. Id. 
 365. United States v. Overmyer, 663 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2011) (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. at 867. 
 368. Id. A district judge in the Sixth Circuit faced with Bistline expressly indicated he was not 
rejecting the guideline, but instead, varying downward based on the characteristics of the defendant. 
United States v. Rothwell, 847 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1078 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (construing Bistline as 
precluding a policy disagreement based on “flaws in [§ 2G2.2] attributable solely to Congressional 
involvement”). 
 369. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1201 n.15 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 370. Id. 
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characteristics in a discussion contained entirely within a rather brief 
footnote.371 First, it regarded the child pornography guideline as not 
“directly derived from [the] Congressional mandate.”372 As the sole 
support for such conclusion, the court referred to the initial 
enhancement the Commission promulgated in 1987 for material 
involving a minor under age twelve.373 Next, the court asserted that, 
unlike the 100:1 congressional policy underlying crack cocaine 
minimum sentencing, the Commission had not clearly disagreed with 
the harshness of the congressionally directed child pornography 
guideline.374 
Curiously, later Eleventh Circuit opinions have somewhat 
morphed the concise Pugh reasoning into rather dubious broader 
conclusions.375 Recent Eleventh Circuit opinions cite Pugh, for 
instance, as affirmatively ruling that § 2G2.2 is not inherently 
flawed.376 On a slightly different front, Eleventh Circuit opinions cite 
Pugh for the conclusion that the child pornography guideline actually 
does adequately take into account empirical data and national 
experience.377 Further, in a more recent decision, an Eleventh Circuit 
panel staunchly clarified that the Pugh result is not mere dicta but 
stands for its ruling that § 2G2.2 is a valid guideline, meaning that 
any arguments about the unreasonableness of the child pornography 
guideline are “in and of themselves” foreclosed.378 
The Pugh doctrine remains established precedent in the Eleventh 
Circuit.379 Recent decisions express that an en banc court or the 
                                                                                                                 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. The court noted the harshness of the child pornography guideline reflects Congress’s concern 
for recidivism and that even the defendant’s expert could not guarantee a zero chance of recidivism. Id. 
 375. See United States v. Rodriguez, 503 F. App’x 841, 842 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Knight, 
496 F. App’x 969, 971 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Scott, 476 F. App’x 845, 846 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 376. Rodriguez, 503 F. App’x at 842; Knight, 496 F. App’x at 971; Scott, 476 F. App’x at 846. 
 377. United States v. Reaid, 455 F. App’x 926, 627 (11th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 2754 
(2012); United States v. Flowers, 438 F. App’x 831, 832–33 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gray, 
405 F. App’x 436, 437 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 378. United States v. Boykin, 497 F. App’x 867, 869 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 379. E.g., Knight, 496 F. App’x at 971; United States v. Ford, 438 F. App’x 822, 825 (11th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1354 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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Supreme Court would be needed to overrule it.380 Pugh was cited, for 
example, in an opinion quickly disposing of the defendant’s 
challenge to his twenty year, statutory maximum sentence for 
distribution.381 The court has apparently, as of late 2013, never 
substantively addressed the circuit split. Interestingly, in one case, 
while acknowledging Dorvee, the court merely reiterated Pugh’s 
precedential value without further commenting on the contrary 
decision.382 The positions and rationales of the final courts of appeals 
in the three-way split follow. 
3.   Neutral 
The remaining three circuits are captured in a sort of neutral 
category in that they have not ruled as a matter of law as to the 
viability of the child pornography guideline. They are deemed here to 
be neutral, or even equivocal, as these appellate courts have 
expressed strong apprehension at the prospect. 
The Seventh Circuit has gone as far as recognizing that criticism of 
the child pornography guideline is “gaining traction.”383 It appears to 
recognize a broad authority for a policy rejection outside the 
crack/powder cocaine disparity context such that sentencing judges 
may, but are not required to, reject guidelines based on such policy 
disagreement.384 Nevertheless, in responding to a defendant’s 
complaint that the guidelines relating to sexual offenders are 
“empirically unsupported, vindictive, and excessively harsh” (with 
supporting citations to Grober II and Dorvee), the Seventh Circuit 
demurred, relying upon separation of powers principles.385 It 
contended that such an argument is “more properly addressed to the 
Sentencing Commission, or to Congress, which has greatly 
influenced the child-pornography guidelines . . . than to an individual 
                                                                                                                 
 380. Knight, 496 F. App’x at 971. 
 381. Flowers, 438 F. App’x at 832–33. 
 382. Scott, 476 F. App’x at 846. 
 383. United States v. Halliday, 672 F.3d 462, 474 (7th Cir. 2012) (vacating for other reasons). 
 384. United States v. Hendrickson, 507 F. App’x 599, 601 (7th Cir. 2013); Halliday, 672 F.3d at 474. 
 385. United States v. Garthus, 652 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied mem., 132 S. Ct. 2373 
(2012). 
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district judge in a sentencing hearing.”386 The court further opined 
that it would be unmanageable and impractical to require that 
sentencing judges examine the legislative history of every applicable 
guideline.387 The circuit has expressed skepticism of the argument 
that the guideline is not based on an empirical method by retorting 
that such argument fails to “account for the possibility that Congress 
itself may have studied the problem of child pornography.”388 
Similarly, in another case, the appellate court disagreed with one of 
the positions the Second Circuit relied on in Dorvee.389 Remarking 
that, to the extent the guidelines routinely produce ranges at the top 
of the maximum, the Seventh Circuit believes it is up to Congress or 
the Commission to take action.390 
For its part, the Eighth Circuit at one point seemingly dismissed a 
defendant’s argument that § 2G2.2 deserves less deference as lacking 
sufficient empirical support in summarily affirming a twenty-five 
year sentence for distribution.391 In another case, the Eighth Circuit, 
unlike the Second Circuit in Dorvee, declined to take up a policy-
based investigation of its own.392 Any challenge to the 
reasonableness of a guideline based on an empirical argument, the 
court ruled, is more properly addressed to the sentencing judge than 
to the appellate court.393 Since then, the Eighth Circuit has at least 
accepted that a sentencing court may vary based on a policy 
disagreement outside the context of cocaine sentencing.394 Still, it 
maintains that Kimbrough does not require that the sentencing court 
even consider a policy rejection; instead, it just permits a sentencing 
judge to do so if she so chooses.395 
                                                                                                                 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. United States v. Schuster, 706 F.3d 800, 808 (7th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 2813 
(2013). 
 389. United States v. Mantanes, 632 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 390. Id. 
 391. United States v. Hubbard, 414 F. App’x 893, 894 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 392. United States v. Muhlenbruch, 682 F.3d 1096, 1102 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 393. Id. 
 394. United States v. Black, 670 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Munjak, 669 F.3d 
906, 907 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 395. United States v. Greenwell, 483 F. App’x 305, 307 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 
967 (2013). 
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Despite acknowledging the sentencing court’s discretion to reject a 
guideline on policy grounds, the Eighth Circuit appears less inclined 
to countenance such rejection if the disagreement is with 
congressional policy.396 It has, for instance, declined a challenge to 
use § 2G2.2 as an “anchor” based on the claim the guideline was 
arbitrary and irrational; the court instead confirmed that the district 
court properly chose to use the guideline and the appellate 
presumption of reasonableness applies even if the guideline range 
results from congressional fiat.397 
There is additional evidence that the Eighth Circuit prefers to be 
deferential to Congress in setting sentencing policy, including 
directing the length of sentences.398 In a single case, the court firmly 
dismissed two constitutional claims the defendant raised against 
§ 2G2.2.399 The defendant argued that he was denied his substantive 
due process right of an individualized sentence as his was based on a 
“discredited guideline” and that § 2G2.2 violates the equal protection 
clause because it punishes child pornography offenses too severely 
compared with other sex-based crimes against children.400 These 
attacks, responded the appellate court, 
fundamentally overstate[] the extent to which legislative 
sentencing provisions are subject to constitutional scrutiny. Once 
a person has been convicted of a crime in accordance with 
constitutional guarantees, determining the severity of his 
punishment is, in the first instance, a legislative task. It is within 
the legislative prerogative to determine, for example, whether 
child pornography offenses should be punished more or less 
harshly than sexual offense s involving personal contact with a 
child.401 
                                                                                                                 
 396. United States v. Hyer, 498 F. App’x 658, 661 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 397. United States v. Althage, 484 F. App’x 76, 77–78 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 398. See United States v. Meirick, 674 F.3d 802, 804–05 (8th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 357 
(2012). 
 399. Id. at 804. 
 400. Id. at 804–05. 
 401. Id. at 805. 
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Further, the panel believed that a guideline provision “‘that 
accurately implements a directive of Congress does not implicate 
substantive due process concerns.’”402 Thus, the Eighth Circuit 
approved of the application of those enhancements enacted by the 
Commission at the direction of Congress, considering the 
Commission, not the courts, is “fully accountable” to Congress.403 
The last of the circuits to be addressed herein is the Tenth Circuit. 
The Tenth Circuit has recognized the ability of a sentencing court to 
vary when it determines that § 2G2.2 recommends an unreasonable 
sentence.404 In one case, a circuit panel referred to the Dorvee and 
Grober II analyses concerning the lack of empirical basis as being 
“quite forceful,” but then also slighted them as having no 
precedential impact for jurisdictional reasons.405 In another case, the 
court similarly warned against relying heavily on policy conclusions 
made in other jurisdictions.406 “[W]hile a court may vary from a 
guideline based on a disagreement with a policy decision of the 
Sentencing Commission, it should do so on a case-by-case basis, not 
merely because other courts have done so in other cases.”407 
It may be curious why the Tenth Circuit is listed herein with the 
neutral group. Whereas the Tenth Circuit has recognized the 
possibility of a policy rejection, there are signs that the Tenth Circuit 
seems unlikely to join the clear pro-policy rejection contingency.408 It 
has opined that basing a sentence on a guideline without an empirical 
basis is not necessarily unreasonable.409 Further, “[g]uidelines levels 
can properly follow Congressional policy regarding the severity of 
punishment appropriate for particular offenses, and that policy need 
                                                                                                                 
 402. Id. (quoting United States v. Fortney, 357 F.3d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
 403. Id. at 805 n.4 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989)). 
 404. United States v. Nghiem, 432 F. App’x 753, 757 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ilgen, 417 F. 
App’x 728, 738 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 405. United States v. Regan, 627 F.3d 1348, 1353–54 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 406. Ilgen, 417 F. App’x at 738. 
 407. Id. The court cited as support for such assertion Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Pepper v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1255 (2011), in which he opined that an appellate court should review 
departures from the guidelines based on a disagreement with Commission policy more strictly than 
when founded upon the individual circumstances in a non-heartland case. Id. 
 408. Nghiem, 432 F. App’x at 757. 
 409. Id. 
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not be founded on scientific data.”410 The Tenth Circuit has, then, 
affirmed within-guidelines sentences411 as well as an upward 
variance in a case with a history of a prior contact offense.412 
This Section has proposed a three-way divide on the issue of 
rejecting the child pornography guideline for policy reasons. The 
next Section navigates these stormy seas and theorizes the best 
responses to the issues. 
B.   The Authority for Policy Nullification 
Sentencing stakeholders disagree on the overall question as to the 
ability of judges to disregard either congressional or Sentencing 
Commission policies. For instance, a leading expert argues that 
idiosyncratic policy preferences by a particular judge should have no 
relevance because individual judges have no institutional capacity to 
make systemic policy choices.413 Instead, he asserts that Congress 
has democratic legitimacy and as a central institution can hear expert 
testimony or utilize the Commission to collect data and ascertain 
various views.414 There is also the perspective that a democratically 
elected Congress is a better authority for determining just 
punishment.415 It is argued that permitting judges to engage in policy 
nullification in terms of congressional- or Commission-led initiatives 
is unjustifiable considering individual judges have no institutional 
ability to instill systemic uniformity.416 
Still, a federal criminal law expert reminds us that Congress is a 
“political, non-expert, lay body.”417 A policy analyst with the Federal 
Public Defenders argues that for Booker to be fully realized “judges 
must turn their attention from calculating the guideline range to 
                                                                                                                 
 410. Id. 
 411. E.g., United States v. Sletten, 458 F. App’x 782, 783 (10th Cir.), cert. denied mem., 133 S. Ct. 
185 (2012); United States v. Croucher, 456 F. App’x 767, 771 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Regan, 
627 F.3d 1348, 1355 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 412. United States v. Herget, 499 F. App’x 743, 749 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 413. Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1388 (2009). 
 414. Id. 
 415. Priester, supra note 142, at 69–72. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Sun Beale, supra note 125, at 385. 
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examining the particular guideline—how it was developed, what the 
Commission says, or does not say, about how it achieves the 
purposes of sentencing, and the research evidence on its fairness and 
effectiveness.”418 He contends that, when the Commission cannot 
substantiate how a particular guideline is “‘sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary’” to achieve statutory goals, judges are left without 
their intellectual guidance to craft a reasoned and just sentence and 
the guidelines then become an end rather than a means to an end.419 
Further, he charges that the Commission has attempted to stigmatize 
and stifle judges’ Booker powers.420 He may be accurate in this 
assessment. The Commission recently recommended that Congress 
require district judges to provide greater justification for outside-
guideline sentences and require a heightened appellate review of 
policy disagreements.421 
Several commentators specifically countenance the idea that 
judges should be obligated to adhere to the current child pornography 
guideline.422 One of them suggests that, even if sentences for child 
pornography possession are longer than actual contact offenses, the 
better solution would be to increase sentences for the latter group.423 
In contrast, a sentencing appeals expert urges no appellate 
presumption of reasonableness for § 2G2.2 especially because it is 
evident that it fails to reflect the Commission’s own conclusions 
about what sentences may be reasonable for those crimes.424 
                                                                                                                 
 418. Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the “Heartland”: Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal Guidelines, 49 
DUQ. L. REV. 675, 677 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 419. Id. at 679–80. 
 420. Id. at 697. 
 421. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, at 9. 
 422. Kathryn A. Kimball, Note, Losing Our Soul: Judicial Discretion in Sentencing Child 
Pornography Offenders, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1515, 1536 (2011) (“Justice requires that courts adhere to the 
democratically decided [child pornography] Guidelines which express the high moral culpability of 
these crimes, deter other potential offenders, and prevent the realistic threat of recurring sexual 
offenses.”); Holly H. Krohel, Comment, Dangerous Discretion: Protecting Children by Amending the 
Federal Child Pornography Statutes to Enforce Sentencing Enhancements and Prevent Noncustodial 
Sentences, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623, 674 (2011) (suggesting statutorily mandating enhancements to 
undermine judicial policy disagreements); Loren Rigsby, Comment, A Call for Judicial Scrutiny: How 
Increased Judicial Discretion Has Led to Disparity and Unpredictability in Federal Sentencings for 
Child Pornography, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1319, 1345 (2010). 
 423. Krohel, supra note 422, at 644. 
 424. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Post-Booker Leniency in Child Pornography Sentencing, 24 FED. 
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The circuit split leaves open certain issues concerning a district 
court’s discretionary ability to categorically reject the child 
pornography guideline. The following commentary offers definitive 
answers. 
1.   Is Kimbrough Restricted to Crack Cocaine? 
The first issue is the basic question as to whether Kimbrough is 
limited to the crack cocaine guideline. In other words, can a judge 
who has a policy disagreement with any other guideline discount it as 
well? In numerous passages in the Kimbrough decision, the majority 
seems to carefully tie its holding and reasoning to the crack cocaine 
guideline.425 In decisions post-Kimbrough, the Court likewise 
commonly couches the Kimbrough result by also tying it to crack 
cocaine sentencing.426 However, other language suggests that its 
intent was not so circumscribed. For example, in Kimbrough itself, 
and repeated in a later decision, the Court indicates its holding in 
Kimbrough is that “under Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, like all 
other Guidelines, are advisory only.”427 Then in the more recent case 
of Pepper v. United States, the Court extended Kimbrough, though 
not to another category of crime.428 Instead, the Court used 
Kimbrough-like reasoning to permit a sentencing judge to consider 
post-sentence rehabilitation when resentencing a defendant, despite 
the fact that doing so violated an express Commission policy.429 The 
Court there explained that “a district court may in appropriate cases 
impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with the 
Commission’s views. That is particularly true where, as here, the 
Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales 
not reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.”430 In 
                                                                                                                 
SENT’G REP. 87, 88 (2011). 
 425. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91, 93, 110 (2007). 
 426. E.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1229, 1245 (2011); Spears v. United States, 555 
U.S. 261, 264 (2009). 
 427. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91; Spears, 555 U.S. at 263. 
 428. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1247. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id.; see also id. at 1256 (Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (summarizing 
Kimbrough as not requiring a sentencing court to give weight to a usual policy decision in the 
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resolving this issue, it is significant that the federal government 
seems to now concede Kimbrough’s application to any policy 
disagreement with a Commission statement or guideline. In Pepper, 
the United States declined to argue that a district judge could not vary 
from the guidelines based on any policy disagreement with the 
Commission.431 The Supreme Court, therefore, was forced to assign 
amicus curiae to argue against the policy rejection.432 
The resolution of this issue in the negative—in that the Kimbrough 
reasoning is not limited to crack cocaine sentencing—necessitates the 
review of two other potential limitations. 
2.   Does Kimbrough Permit Rejecting Congressional Policy? 
The next question is whether a judge may vary from a guideline 
based on a policy disagreement with a congressional directive. The 
Supreme Court has previously recognized Congress’s power over 
sentencing.433 In a decision over twenty years ago, a case involving 
the Court upholding the constitutionality of the Commission and the 
guidelines, the Court accepted that Congress could revoke or amend 
any guideline at any time.434 In Kimbrough, it recognized Congress’s 
ability to also control sentencing through mandatory minimum 
sentencing statutes.435 Both opinions suggest that congressional 
mandate might override the decisions of the Commission and the 
judiciary. Indeed, the Kimbrough decision expressly distinguished 
the policy at issue there as being one created by the Commission 
rather than Congress.436 Nonetheless, there is substantial other 
evidence that any congressional edict impacting a guideline—outside 
statutory minimums and maximums—cannot control.437 A primary 
                                                                                                                 
guidelines). 
 431. Brief for the United States at 38–39, Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011) (No. 09-
6822). 
 432. Id. 
 433. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393–94 (1989). 
 434. Id. 
 435. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007). 
 436. See id. at 103. 
 437. Though, even minimums and maximums can be overruled as Eighth Amendment violations if 
found to be cruel and unusual punishment. Steiker, supra note 8, at 34–35. 
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consideration here is that it would appear to be unconstitutional as 
violating Booker’s remedy of rendering the guidelines advisory. 
To posit a simple example, assume crime X has no mandatory 
minimum and the maximum prison term is sixty months. In other 
words, the possible statutory punishment is no prison term 
(probation) or up to sixty months of incarceration. Then assume 
Congress directs the Commission to institute a base offense level of 
fifteen for crime X. With no criminal history score, a base offense 
level of fifteen yields a range of eighteen to twenty-four months.438 
The sentencing judge in our hypothetical, though, has a categorical 
disagreement with the severity of eighteen to twenty-four months for 
crime X because she has determined that even eighteen months 
would be greater than necessary to satisfy statutory sentencing goals. 
Is she precluded from varying downward from the clear, 
congressionally directed guideline? Pursuant to Booker principles, 
the answer must be in the negative.439 Otherwise the base offense 
level of fifteen for crime X would constitute a mandatory guideline, a 
concept in direct violation of Booker.440 A similar conclusion would 
apply to any congressional requirement that would effectively 
mandate enhancements for crime X or otherwise tie the sentencer’s 
hands in terms of the discretion provided by Booker and its 
progeny.441 
A response to this may be that a congressionally mandated base 
offense level is analogous to a mandatory minimum sentence, which 
Congress does have the power to force onto the judiciary. This 
argument is appealing. To the extent a mandatory base offense level 
required a judge to make a factual determination beyond what was 
found by a jury or admitted in a plea agreement, it would clearly be 
unconstitutional.442 But what if the mandatory base offense level did 
not require such a factual determination? That is more arguable. For 
                                                                                                                 
 438. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2013). 
 439. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 440. See generally id. 
 441. The Supreme Court has recently ruled that any fact-finding that would invoke a mandatory 
minimum or increase the statutory minimum must be found by a jury. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). 
 442. See id. 
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the reasons set forth herein, the better approach under Booker 
principles, at least until Congress makes the necessary changes to 
make the guidelines system compliant with the Sixth Amendment, is 
to keep mandatory minimums theoretically separate from guidelines 
to reduce confusion. Hence, the best conclusion to this question is 
that the all guidelines are advisory principle should not distinguish 
between those promulgated independently by the Commission and 
those which are not. 
This conclusion is bolstered by other interests. Notably, the 
Supreme Court has continued to highlight the other congressional 
requirement involving § 3553(a) factors.443 In Kimbrough, it gave 
respect to the Commission’s judgment that Congress’s 100:1 
crack/powder cocaine ratio suffered serious deficiencies regarding 
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including seriousness of the offense, 
proportionality among differentially culpable offenders, and 
disparities (at least in Kimbrough with respect to race).444 The 
sentencing factors were considered so essential that the Court in 
Pepper actually struck a federal statute, which precluded judges from 
considering post-sentence rehabilitation upon resentencing, because 
it failed to comply with a relevant statutory sentencing circumstance 
regarding the risk of future offending and would otherwise be in 
violation of Booker’s advisory remedy.445 The Court, thereby, has 
signaled its willingness to find federal legislation unconstitutional if 
it interferes with the consideration of § 3553(a) factors or with the 
advisory nature of the guidelines system. 
Any rule that would require a determination on the origin of any 
policy would be practically inefficient as well. Such a differentiation 
would lead to an unfortunate exercise in trying to elicit the basis of 
every guideline and every particular piece of a guideline. The 
guidelines, including their commentary and policy statements, 
represent thousands of policies, perhaps millions depending on how 
thinly one slices the pie, so to speak. And because the Commission is 
                                                                                                                 
 443. E.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 113–14 (2007). 
 444. Id. at 97. 
 445. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1242 (2011). 
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subject to few of the transparency requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, it is under no obligation to disclose its policymaking 
process or even to explain how it came up with any particular policy 
or guideline provision.446 Too many of the guidelines appear to be 
sheer anomalies, odd provisions that defy rationality and bear no 
public paper trail explaining them. Further, if a litigant were to try to 
determine the origin of a particular guideline policy and was 
confronted by a dearth of information on which to make such an 
assessment, reliance on asking for the Commission’s guidance will 
likely be fruitless. When formally invited by a federal prosecutor to 
send a representative to explain the child pornography guideline, 
notably, the Commission outright refused.447 
Additional problems would plague a rule reliant on differentiating 
policies derived from Congress. One is the likely erroneous 
assumption that it is a simple, dichotomous query. The legislature 
none too rarely enacts legislation that represents multiple and 
sometimes conflicting policy statements. The Sentencing Reform Act 
is itself a conglomeration of inconsistent and vague goals and 
mandates. Limiting Kimbrough to Commission initiated guidelines, 
too, would unfortunately require creating a hodgepodge of mandatory 
versus nonmandatory guidelines. This type of historical exercise is 
not only impractical; it would also appear to contradict Booker’s 
assumption that “Congress would not have authorized a mandatory 
system in some cases and a nonmandatory system in others.”448 
Recently, both the Commission and the executive branch appear to 
have conceded these constitutional issues.449 In the 2012 report to 
Congress previously discussed, the Commission comments that 
distinguishing between congressional or Commission policy in terms 
of judicial variances appears to be a concept disfavored both by 
federal courts and the executive branch.450 To support the latter’s 
                                                                                                                 
 446. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Practice_Procedure_Rules.pdf. 
 447. Grober I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 413 (D.N.J. 2008). 
 448. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 266 (2005). 
 449. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, at 40. 
 450. Id. 
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perspective, it directs attention to the Solicitor General’s concession 
in a case in which it was argued that a judge could not legally 
disregard the career offender guideline for policy reasons since that 
guideline was a result of clear congressional directive. The Solicitor 
General’s filing countered: “‘Such a conclusion would have to rest on 
a faulty premise: that congressional directives to the Sentencing 
Commission are equally binding on the courts.’”451 The Solicitor 
General’s filing further considered the issue of whether Kimbrough 
means “congressional directives to the Sentencing Commission are 
equally binding on sentencing courts.” 452 It responded: “That 
premise is incorrect.”453 Moreover, the brief explained that 
distinguishing between whether a policy derived from the 
Commission as opposed to Congress would lead to a fruitless 
exercise of parsing subsections.454 
In other briefs filed recently, as well, federal prosecutors appear to 
have officially capitulated. For instance, they have stated in a filing 
that “Kimbrough made clear that a sentencing court has authority to 
deviate from . . . a categorical disagreement with the way a particular 
guideline operates (and the policy that informs such guideline), even 
when the guideline provision is a direct reflection of congressional 
directive.”455 Similarly, in another brief, the Solicitor General wrote 
that 
[e]ven when Congress does legislate Guidelines changes itself, 
such legislation does not have a direct effect on criminal 
sentences. Instead, it becomes incorporated into a framework 
that is itself only advisory. The independent judgment of the 
sentencing judge thus provides a buffer against the “danger that 
                                                                                                                 
 451. Id. (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (M.D. Fla. 2011)). 
 452. Brief for the United States at 9, Vazquez v. United States, 558 U.S. 1144 (2010) (No. 09-5370), 
2009 WL 5423020. 
 453. Id. 
 454. See id at 11 n.1. 
 455. Brief for Appellee at 15, United States v. Medina-Medina, No. 11-2308 (1st Cir Aug. 27 2012), 
2012 WL 3776652; see also Brief of Appellee at 14, United States v. Stiggers, 499 F. App’x 954 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (No. 12-11876-DD), 2012 WL 2989869 (articulating Kimbrough broadly: the “Supreme 
Court significantly expanded the scope of permissible variance from the Guidelines. Kimbrough allows 
a district court to categorically disagree with policy determinations underlying the Guidelines.”). 
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legislatures might disfavor certain persons after the fact.”456 
Furthermore, the brief indicates that Booker means that “imbuing 
the guidelines with the ‘force and effect of laws’” would be 
unconstitutional.457 
Federal prosecutors have recently recognized another important 
value in permitting judicial policy disagreements. Since sentencing 
judges’ decisions are “entirely insulated from political concerns,” 
they can properly assist the Commission in its empirical analyses.458 
In another symbolic bow to judicial policy decisions, the Solicitor 
General declined to press for an appellate standard of closer review 
of them.459 
Overall, the foregoing observations champion a conclusion that 
district courts have the discretion to vary from a guideline either in 
the individual case or for a categorical reason when they have any 
policy disagreement, whether nullifying a policy decision by the 
Commission or Congress.460 This still, though, leaves open the issue 
of disparity. The Court has addressed the subject in several cases. For 
example, in Kimbrough, the government argued that permitting a 
variance based on a disagreement with the crack/powder cocaine 
ratio could mean that “defendants with identical real conduct will 
receive markedly different sentences, depending on nothing more 
than the particular judge drawn for sentencing.”461 The Court 
deflected the concern, indicating that though variances might detract 
from uniformity they are an inevitable cost of the Booker remedy.462 
It recognized that, while avoiding unwarranted disparities is a 
§ 3553(a) factor to be considered, it is not the only one,463 and it is 
                                                                                                                 
 456. Brief for the United States at 43–44, Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (No. 12-62), 
2013 WL 315237 (quoting Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 253 (2000)). 
 457. Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005)). 
 458. Id. at 42. 
 459. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 5–8, VandeBrake v. United States, No. 12-488 (U.S. 
Jan. 22, 2013), 2013 WL 243395. 
 460. This statement is not meant here to apply to statutory minimums or maximums. 
 461. Brief for the United States at 40, United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (No. 06-6330). 
 462. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108. 
 463. Id. at 90–91. 
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not appropriate to “elevate” it above the other § 3553(a) factors.464 
Besides, disparities are not necessarily the result of arbitrary 
sentencing practices as they may result from the ordinary operation 
of sentencing practices.465 Sentencing disparities may properly occur 
through such other avenues as appellate review, opportunity for 
rehabilitation, sentencing errors, prosecutorial discretion, and 
reversals of convictions.466 Further, it is reasonable to believe that 
disparities can be healthy and informative outcomes as they may 
suggest a need for change. Justice Breyer, a former Sentencing 
Commission official, describes the interplay: “Trial courts, appellate 
courts, and the Commission all have a role to play in what is meant to 
be an iterative, cooperative institutional effort to bring about a more 
uniform and a more equitable sentencing system.”467 
3.   Should Courts Reject the Child Pornography Guideline? 
The foregoing leads to the question of whether the child 
pornography guideline should be disregarded. The arguments 
expounded upon in this Article in support of disfavoring it are 
ultimately persuasive. To the extent predilections for lengthy 
sentences are based on assumptions that child pornography offenders 
are at high risk of either having committed a prior contact sexual 
offense or will in the future, such presumptions are erroneous, as the 
author has addressed elsewhere.468 Plus, there are additional reasons 
to call for the guideline’s immediate withdrawal and complete 
overhaul. The starting point itself (high base offense level plus the 
significant increases through the universal enhancements) has an 
                                                                                                                 
 464. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1249 (2011). 
 465. Id. at 1248. 
 466. Id. at 1248–49. 
 467. Id. at 1255 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 468. See generally Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net-Widening Effect, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679 (2012) [hereinafter Hamilton, Child Pornography Crusade]; Melissa 
Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political 
Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 545 (2011). In its 2012 report to Congress, the Commission 
suggested that both theses appear true, citing the results of research. FED. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
OFFENSES, supra note 19, at 171–206. While the Commission’s effort to address these questions is 
laudable, the report and its conclusions are problematic for a host of reasons. A critical assessment of 
that lengthy report would require an expository rebuttal and is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. 
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unfortunate consequence called an “anchoring effect.”469 “Higher 
sentences are awarded when parties start with an anchor of a higher 
demand even when it is clear to the judge that the source of the 
anchor is not rational.”470 Then the guideline’s tendency toward 
unreasonable aggregation does not permit differentiating between 
what are very different levels of culpability. By grouping offenders 
into an extremely broad categorical guideline, the Commission has 
acted inconsistently with its statutory directives. It effectively has 
substantially replaced individualized sentencing with aggregated 
sentencing, creating unwarranted uniformity for dissimilar offenses 
and leading to what one commentator calls equal nonsense for all.471 
Finally, when a guideline clearly does not guide its constituencies, its 
credibility is forfeited. 
This Section has postulated a three-way split among the circuits. 
Such a situation has legal and constitutional significance in and of 
itself. But other questions arise. Does the split actually matter with 
respect to the likelihood that individual district judges within each 
circuit will vary downward or in the length of the resulting sentences 
issued? Are there actual disparities in sentencing across the country? 
If so, are disparities driven along the lines of the circuit split? In other 
words, the issue of interest becomes whether this has been merely a 
doctrinal exercise or whether significant sentencing variations 
exist.472 The next Section provides empirical perspectives to try to 
answer these questions through a variety of simplistic and 
multivariate statistical runs and analyses using Commission data. 
                                                                                                                 
 469. Jane Goodman-Delahunty & Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Unconscious Influences in Sentencing 
Decisions: A Research Review of Psychological Sources of Disparity, 42 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 19, 
21 (2010). 
 470. Id. 
 471. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 4 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 161, 161–63 (1991). 
 472. Steiker, supra note 8, at 44 (“This profound disagreement among the federal appellate courts 
guarantees that there will be an increase—probably a substantial one—in sentencing disparities among 
child pornography offenders, depending on whether they are sentenced in circuits that strongly advise, 
permit, or forbid sentencing judges to reject the applicable Guidelines.”). 
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IV.   STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The Sentencing Commission makes publicly available databases 
containing information on all sentencing decisions, and they include 
a host of rich and informative data measures.473 The data are in a 
form that can easily be analyzed using standard statistical software. 
This Section contains various statistical perspectives that appear 
relevant to explore more fully the issues and controversies discussed 
previously in this Article. The statistics herein utilize the 
Commission’s data on nonproduction child pornography sentences 
issued in fiscal year 2011.474 The sample data yield a variety of 
descriptive measures and permit a variety of correlation tests and a 
multivariate logistic regression analysis. 475 
A.   Bivariate Measures 
The sample comprises sentencing data on 1,645 defendants. The 
following table includes a variety of descriptive measures of the 
dataset (Table 1).476 
 
Table 1: Select Descriptive Statistics 
Final Sentence 
Guideline Minimum  
94.72 months (mean) 
127.95 months (mean) 
Base Offense Level 
Final Offense Level 
19.95 (mean) 
30.42 (mean) 
In Custody  57.8% 
                                                                                                                 
 473. See Research and Statistics, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_ 
Statistics/index.cfm (providing access to annual reports and sourcebooks dating back to 1995). 
 474. Data and analyses compiled by the author and on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review. See also Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
 475. The D.C. Circuit is included in overall statistics, but excluded from the circuit comparison 
statistics and the multivariate model due to the very small number of child pornography defendants in 
that jurisdiction (n=11). Technically, the dataset represents a population, rather than a sample, as it 
includes all child pornography offenders sentenced in the chosen year. 
 476. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
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Plea 97.1% 
Criminal History Score 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
 
82.5% 
  7.6% 
  6.5% 
  1.9% 
  1.0% 
    .5% 
Minimum = Maximum   9.6% 
Enhancements 
Minor under 12 
Use of a Computer 
Violent Content 
Distribution 
Number of Images 
History of Sexual Abuse 
 
96.1% 
97.4% 
79.6% 
48.8% 
96.8% 
11.4% 
Male 99.1% 
Race 
White 
Black 
Hispanic 
Other 
 
89.2% 
  2.4% 
  6.0% 
  2.2% 
Education 
Less than High School 
High School Graduate 
Some College 
College Graduate 
 
  9.5% 
32.8% 
38.2% 
18.4% 
 
The foregoing table and its statistics, along with additional data not 
explicitly provided therein, provide a number of measures to explore 
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the general descriptors of the child pornography defendant group in 
federal sentencing. The vast majority of defendants sentenced for 
child pornography offenses in 2011 were white males and American 
citizens. The average age was forty-two years, with the range from 
nineteen to eighty-eight years old.477 Approximately 11% were age 
twenty-five and under, 28% were over age fifty, and 5% were age 
sixty-five or older.478 This is a particularly educated group among 
federal defendants, with the vast majority of child pornography 
defendants holding a high school degree and almost half having post-
secondary educational experience. 
The guidelines rank criminal history scores on an ordinal scale 
from I-VI with VI being the highest category.479 Over 80% of child 
pornography defendants earned the minimum criminal history score 
of I, meaning either no prior criminal offenses, prior offenses were 
minor, or prior crimes were too dated to count. Fewer than 4% 
received a criminal history score of IV or above. Ninety-six percent 
of child pornography defendants received some point reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility for their offense behavior.480 It is notable 
that the average child pornography defendant was older, relatively 
educated, assigned a minimal criminal history, and accepted 
responsibility. All of these attributes favor a low-risk offender with 
good prospects for rehabilitation.481 
Few child pornography defendants went to trial. Almost all of the 
cases were resolved on guilty pleas. At the time of sentencing, 40% 
were not in custody, which might indicate that a large percentage was 
not deemed to be a risk to the community after their arrests. 
With regard to the application of the child pornography guideline, 
the universality of certain enhancements is evident. Three of the six 
enhancements were applied in almost all cases: material involving 
minors under twelve, use of a computer, and number of images. The 
violent content enhancement was applied in a substantial majority of 
                                                                                                                 
 477. See generally id. 
 478. See generally id. 
 479. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 cmt. (2013). 
 480. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
 481. See Hamilton, Child Pornography Crusade, supra note 468, at 1726. 
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cases, and the distribution enhancement was present in almost half of 
the cases. In contrast, the history of sexual abuse enhancement was 
assigned to only about one out of every nine defendants. The 
commonality of the enhancements might help explain the fact that 
enhancements accounted for one-third of the average final offense 
level,482 a number that along with the criminal history score 
determines the guideline minimum.483 Such occurrences likely also 
contribute to why the guideline minimum was simultaneously the 
guideline maximum in approximately 10% of the cases. 
A particular combination of sentencing factors suggests that 
prosecutors are engaging in charge bargaining. For those cases in 
which the files were designated as no applicable child pornography 
mandatory minimum, over one-third received a distribution-related 
enhancement.484 Because distribution and receipt are five-year 
mandatory minimum crimes,485 the presence of distribution 
enhancements in so many cases where no mandatory minimum is 
flagged suggests that the offense of distribution was downgraded to 
possession where no mandatory minimum applies.486 The implication 
offered here is consistent with the Commission’s own previous study. 
Using fiscal year 2010 data, the Commission conducted a more in-
depth inspection of the case fact files on a sub-sample of child 
pornography sentences.487 It found the files suggested that more than 
half of those convicted of possession—for which a mandatory 
minimum is not applicable—had also engaged in distribution conduct 
that would, strictly speaking, have triggered a five-year mandatory 
minimum charge.488 From this revelation, the Commission staff, in a 
report to Congress, warned of two significant consequences. One is 
that “a substantial number of similarly situated offenders are being 
treated differently under the mandatory minimum penalties 
                                                                                                                 
 482. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
 483. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1. 
 484. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
 485. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A(a), 2252A(b)(1) (five-year mandatory minimum for distribution or receipt). 
 486. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A(b), 2252A(b)(2) (no mandatory minimum for possession). 
 487. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FED. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (2011). 
 488. Id. at 317–18. 
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applicable to child pornography offenses.”489 The second is it signals 
that “prosecutors may believe the mandatory minimum penalties for 
certain child pornography offenses, and the resulting guidelines 
sentencing range, are excessive in individual cases.”490 
The foregoing statistics imply charge bargaining on a separate 
front. Another consequence of downgrading distribution offenses to 
possession is that the starting base offense level begins lower (a 
reduction from twenty-two to eighteen points).491 Even if the typical 
enhancements are added, the ending range remains lower. Thus, these 
measures might be evidence that at least some prosecutors are 
sensitive to the harshness of sentences driven by the guideline and 
mandatory minimums. On the other hand, there is the possibility that 
charge bargaining is instead intended for purposes of efficiency by 
encouraging plea agreements and faster resolution of cases. 
The bivariate results yield additional statistics. The base offense 
level averaged twenty points, which makes sense considering that 
twenty-two is the base offense level in nonproduction child 
pornography crimes other than possession.492 The mean final offense 
level (after adjustments) increased by half to just over thirty points. 
The range for the final offense level was widespread, almost tripling 
from fifteen to forty-three points.493 The highest reached a ceiling of 
forty-three, the highest possible level recognized in the federal 
guideline system.494 
The mean sentence for nonproduction child pornography crimes in 
fiscal year 2011 was approximately ninety-five months, or almost 
eight years.495 Yet there was great variation. On the lowest end of 
sentences issued, thirty-two defendants (2%) received probation-only 
sentences, seventy-five defendants (5%) received sentences of one 
                                                                                                                 
 489. Id. at 318. 
 490. Id. at 365. 
 491. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2013). 
 492. Id. 
 493. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
 494. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (forty-three is highest final offense level); 
see generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85 (highest final offense level issued was forty-three 
points). 
 495. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, at 116, 177. Life sentences were converted to 470 
months as is common in sentencing statistics. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 16, at app. A. 
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year or less, and 465 defendants (28%) received sentences of less 
than five years.496 On the upper side, seventy-nine defendants (5%) 
received sentences of twenty years or more, with an upper threshold 
of fifty years for a single defendant.497 These results show wide 
variability in final sentences, despite the vast majority having begun 
at the same base offense level.498 Overall, the range of incarcerative 
punishments for nonproduction child pornography crimes was 
between zero (probation) to fifty years.499 Then comparing sentences 
for the lowest and highest ranges, 5% received sentences less than 
five years while an equivalent 5% were sentenced to at least twenty 
years.500 
The previous Section discussed the theoretical importance of 
differences in rulings between circuits. There, the broader issue was 
the constitutional power of district judges to disregard the child 
pornography guideline. Here, potential statistical variations in 
sentencing between the different circuits are provided. The mean 
sentences in the circuits are shown below, ranked in numerical order 
of sentence averages (Figure A).501 
                                                                                                                 
 496. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
 497. See generally id. 
 498. See generally id. 
 499. See generally id. 
 500. See generally id. 
 501. See generally id. 
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Figure A 
 
The numbers reflected in Figure A indicate that, from the lowest to 
the highest, the mean sentence increased by forty-seven months 
(almost four years), representing a 65% differential. Significantly, 
mean sentences provide simplistic support for the three-way circuit 
split posited in Section III. The four circuits in the pro-policy 
rejection group (left circle) are the same four circuits with the lowest 
mean sentences. The four circuits in the anti-policy rejection group 
(right circle) give the highest mean sentences. Two of the neutral 
circuits are in the middle, with the Seventh Circuit being the outlier 
with the longest mean sentence of all. 
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Circuit variations in sentencing were empirically studied in 
additional ways. A new variable, named Policy Acceptance, was 
created for the appellate level matter of law ruling on whether a 
district court could categorically reject the child pornography 
guideline. The variable is ranked on an ordinal scale: pro-rejection 
(yes), neutral, anti-rejection (no). Circuit courts were assigned to 
each group according to the split conceived in Section III. 
Correlation tests showed that Policy Acceptance was significantly 
and positively correlated (p<.001) with a below-guideline sentence. 
Additionally, Policy Acceptance was significantly and negatively 
correlated (p<.001) with the sentence given, meaning that it 
correlated with a lower sentence. In addition, the possibility that the 
circuit level’s position on the issue factors into district judges’ 
sentencing decisions is bolstered when considering mean sentences. 
The length of the mean sentence was consistent with whether the 
defendants were within a circuit that was pro-rejection, neutral, or 
anti-rejection (Table 2).502 
 
Table 2 
Policy Circuits Mean 
Sentence 
Pro-Rejection 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th  75.53 
Neutral 7th, 8th, 10th   96.15 
Anti-Rejection 4th, 5th, 6th, 11th 109.51 
 
The next statistical measure to be considered concerns measures of 
conformance. Overall, almost 33% of child pornography sentences in 
2011 were within-guideline range, approximately 66% were below-
guideline recommendations (18% of which were government-
sponsored), and less than 2% were above-guideline.503 The variations 
                                                                                                                 
 502. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
 503. See generally id. 
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in percentages across circuits are represented below (Figure B).504 
The upper band represents the percentage of above-guideline 
sentences and the white band indicates the percentage of within-
guideline sentences. The next two bands combined are the percentage 
of below-guideline sentences, here separately distinguished for 
percentage of government-sponsored below-range sentences and all 
other below-range sentences. Figure B is in numerical order of circuit 
number. 
 
Figure B 
 
 
The next data analysis was to combine the effects of downward 
variances with mean sentences. The results show that, when any 
below-guideline sentences were imposed, the consequences were 
significant. Overall, the mean sentence with a below-guideline 
variance was 72.68 months (roughly 6 years), compared to a mean of 
                                                                                                                 
 504. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, at 117–19; see generally Commission Datafiles, supra 
note 85. 
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136.90 months (about 11 years) otherwise.505 The mean sentences 
related to whether a downward variance was given are shown below 
(Figure C).506 The figure conveys information from left to right in 
order of circuit number. 
 
Figure C 
 
 
These simple statistics are enlightening in terms of showing 
support for a widespread boycott of this guideline by district judges 
as well as demonstrating significant circuit level deviations. Overall, 
the average guideline minimum was about 128 months, yet the 
average sentence actually given was about ninety-five months.507 
This means that, on average, actual sentences were almost three years 
below, or a 25% decrease from, the average guideline minimum. This 
large difference is itself notable. Still, as the immediately preceding 
figure suggests, the mean sentence is correlated with a decision to 
                                                                                                                 
 505. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
 506. See generally id. 
 507. See generally id. 
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vary downward and the circuit in which the defendant is sentenced. 
Notwithstanding, simple statistics can mask whether a correlation 
may be due to other unrelated factors. It is theoretically possible, for 
example, that higher percentages of offenders in the anti-policy 
rejection circuits are simply more culpable offenders with 
characteristics rendering them at higher risk and warranting use of 
longer sentences. Accordingly, these issues are the focus of a 
multivariate regression analysis, which can control for other relevant 
variables. 
B.   Multivariate Results 
Will circuit differences exist when holding other relevant variables 
of interest constant? A methodological choice was made to focus on 
downward variances rather than on mean sentence considering the 
results exemplified in Figure C. A multivariate logistic regression 
analysis was employed, which is the appropriate model when the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. Here, the dependent variable is 
whether the court issued a sentence that constituted a downward 
variance from the recommended guideline range (yes=1; no=0). The 
independent variables used in the regression include a host of legally 
relevant variables, such as initial base offense level, final offense 
level, criminal history score, acceptance of responsibility, and the 
guideline minimum recommendation. Because the guideline 
minimum number of months was significantly skewed to the right 
due to high outliers, the model uses the natural log of the number. 
The guideline minimum number represents the combined effect of 
the offense level and criminal history through the guidelines’ grid. 
A series of dummy variables for circuit courts of appeals are the 
main issue of interest here. The Eighth Circuit is the dummy category 
because it represents a neutral circuit in the three-way policy 
rejection circuit split proposed in Section III. Also included in the 
model are additional variables comprised of whether the minimum 
recommended sentence was the same as the maximum (yes=1; no=0), 
custody status (in custody=1; not in custody=0), and conviction after 
trial (trial=1; plea=0). Recoded from a series of file variables is a new 
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variable titled General Adequacy Issue, which was coded in the 
positive if the sentencing judge listed her concern with the general 
adequacy of the relevant guideline (here all cases relied on § 2G2.2) 
as a reason for the sentence issued. In addition, a few demographic 
variables are encompassed, including gender, race, age, and 
education. 
There are 1,604 cases508 in the logistic regression model (Table 
3).509 The resulting regression model was significant at the p<.001 
level. The model successfully predicted 86% of cases with a below-
guideline sentence and 48% of those given a within-guideline 
sentence or upper variance. Overall, 73% of predictions were 
accurate. The columns represent, from the left, the independent 
variables of interest and their corresponding coefficients, standard 
errors, and odds ratios. Odds ratios are used as they generally provide 
more interpretable representations of their complementary 
coefficients. 
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Model 
Variable 
 
Federal Circuit  
(8th Circuit as reference) 
1st Circuit 
2nd Circuit 
3rd Circuit 
4th Circuit 
5th Circuit 
6th Circuit 
7th Circuit 
9th Circuit 
10th Circuit 
11th Circuit 
B 
 
 
 
.766 
.715* 
.763* 
-.055 
-.766*** 
.334 
-.010 
.695** 
.063 
-.256 
S.E. 
 
 
 
.449 
.310 
.324 
.252 
.232 
.237 
.277 
.226 
.284 
.236 
Odds 
Ratio 
 
 
2.150 
2.045 
2.146 
.946 
.465 
1.397 
.990 
2.004 
1.065 
.774 
                                                                                                                 
 508. Excluded from the original dataset of n=1,645 are defendants sentenced in the D.C. Circuit 
(n=11) and other cases in which data was missing in at least one of the independent variables. 
 509. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
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Criminal History Score 
Base Offense Level 
Final Offense Level 
Guideline Minimum (logged) 
Acceptance of Responsibility 
Minimum Equals Maximum 
General Adequacy Issue 
Trial 
In Custody 
Age 30 or Younger 
Race (White as reference) 
Black 
Hispanic 
Other 
Education (Less than High School 
as reference) 
High School Graduate 
Some College 
College Graduate 
Male 
Constant 
 
n=1,604 
-2 log likelihood=1671.715 
Nagelkerke R2=.301 
Model chi-square=394.700 
-.201* 
-.200*** 
.160*** 
-.601 
1.270* 
-.473* 
4.042*** 
.146 
-1.268*** 
.785*** 
 
.566 
.291 
.195 
 
 
.051 
.174 
.346 
-.274 
2.174 
.090 
.039 
.047 
.442 
.576 
.216 
1.016 
.665 
.137 
.152 
 
.404 
.276 
.480 
 
 
.212 
.211 
.238 
.673 
1.197
.818 
.819 
1.174 
.548 
3.560 
.623 
56.956 
1.157 
.281 
2.192 
 
1.762 
1.338 
1.216 
 
 
1.053 
1.190 
1.414 
.760 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
The circuit split continues to resonate in the logistic model. 
Defendants in all four circuits on the positive side of accepting, as a 
matter of law, a policy rejection of the child pornography guideline 
were noticeably more likely (holding other variables of interest 
constant) to have received a downward variance than defendants 
sentenced in the reference category using a neutral circuit. The odds 
in each pro-policy rejection circuit of a below-guideline sentence 
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were at least two times greater than the odds of receiving a below-
guideline sentence in the neutral Eighth Circuit, with three of the 
results being statistically significant. The odds of a below-guideline 
sentence in the other two neutral circuits are roughly equivalent to 
the Eighth Circuit, neither of which reached any measure of 
significance. 
The results for comparisons to circuits in the anti-policy rejection 
circuits were divided. The odds of defendants receiving a below-
guideline sentence in the Eighth Circuit were roughly equivalent to 
those in one circuit, greater than the odds in two of the circuits, but 
less than the other circuit in this group. For instance, the odds of a 
downward variance in the Sixth Circuit are 40% greater than the 
Eighth Circuit, though it was not statistically significant. The one 
statistically significant result within the anti-policy rejection circuits 
was in the Fifth Circuit, where the odds of a downward variance in 
the Eighth Circuit were 2.15 times greater than in the Fifth Circuit. 
These results, overall, support the concern that circuit disparities 
exist for sentences, at least for downward variances, in child 
pornography sentencing. And the circuit disparities may be linked to 
the circuit split in the appellate level legal rulings on the ability to 
reject the child pornography guideline. To be clear, though, this 
model is not a causative model and did not attempt to isolate case 
decisions based on the timing of circuit level decisions. One reason is 
that several of the circuit opinions upon which the posited three-way 
split is founded are too new and sentencing statistics that post-date 
them are not yet available. Thus, this model cannot represent a direct 
impact of the circuit split on the likelihood of variances, but it 
provides substantive evidence of a potential connection. 
Even though the circuit split was the main focus, several other 
variables yielded interesting results. As would be expected, a higher 
base offense level and a higher criminal history score each decreased 
the odds of a below-guideline sentence, both statistically significant. 
These results suggest that the guideline does continue to have an 
anchoring effect. A one point increase in each measure decreased the 
odds by 22%. For every one percent increase in the guideline 
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minimum, the odds of a defendant receiving a below-guideline 
variance decreased 82%, a statistically significant result. In contrast, 
the odds of a below-guideline variance increased 17% for each 
additional point in the final offense level, a statistically significant 
result. This might provide support, albeit indirectly, for general 
dissatisfaction with the child pornography guideline enhancements, 
which substantially drive up offense level calculations. However, as 
the final offense level can be impacted by adjustments for other 
reasons, a definitive conclusion is not possible from this model. 
A reduction for acceptance of responsibility was a strong predictor. 
The odds of a downward variance were 3.6 times greater when such a 
reduction occurred than when it did not, a statistically significant 
result. It could be that judges perceived the lower guideline range 
based on a strict calculation of the guideline reduction itself (usually 
2–3 points) was insufficient reward for defendants who accepted 
responsibility. The odds of a below-guideline sentence for defendants 
not in custody at the time of sentencing were 3.6 times greater than 
the odds for those in custody, also statistically significant.510 Since 
pretrial detention is often a risk-based decision, this latter result 
likely is because custody status reflects other factors suggesting the 
defendant’s risk level.511 For instance, a separate bivariate correlation 
test (not shown here) indicated a positive correlation between being 
in custody at sentencing and criminal history score (p<.001).512 There 
was no indication of a trial penalty with respect to the odds of a 
downward variance. 
Results for the demographic variables will be briefly noted. The 
single statistically significant result related to demographic 
characteristics was an age-related variable. The odds of a downward 
variance for those under age thirty were 2.2 times greater than the 
odds for those thirty and over, a statistically significant result. The 
odds of a below-guideline sentence for Blacks, Hispanics, and Others 
                                                                                                                 
 510. See generally id. 
 511. Cassia Spohn, The Effects of the Offender’s Race, Ethnicity, and Sex on Federal Sentencing 
Outcomes in the Guidelines Era, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 80–81 (2013) (noting research 
supporting positive effect of pretrial detention on sentencing severity). 
 512. See generally Commission Datafiles, supra note 85. 
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were higher (76%, 34%, and 22%, respectively) than the odds for 
White defendants. From a racial disparity perspective, this 
distinguishes child pornography defendants from many other 
criminals in the federal system.513 The odds of a downward variance 
for male defendants were 1.3 times lower than the odds for females, 
meaning that females were more likely to receive a downward 
variance. As education level increases (as indicated in the ordinal 
dummy variables), the odds of a below-guideline sentence increases. 
It is noted that a few additional demographic variables proved 
insignificant, and since they were not of particular interest for the 
Article’s purposes, were removed from the final model. These 
included citizenship, marital status, and number of dependent 
children. 
The logistic regression model yielded another notable perspective. 
The most robust independent variable in the model in terms of odds 
ratios was the General Adequacy Issue factor. The odds of a below-
guideline sentence when the judge invoked a general adequacy 
explanation were fifty-six times greater than without that 
explanation, a statistically significant result. This result strongly 
reinforces the salience of federal judges’ dissatisfaction with the 
child pornography guideline as being inadequate in providing advice 
for a reasonable sentence and their drawing upon that rationale to 
justify disregarding it. 
In sum, this Section offered empirical support for disparities 
nationwide in sentencing for child pornography crimes. Empirical 
measures also underscored the circuit split posited in Section III. The 
results were substantially consistent between downward variances 
and circuit level holdings on the ability to reject the guideline for 
policy reasons. Differences between circuits were observed even in a 
logistic regression model that was able to control for other potentially 
relevant factors. 
                                                                                                                 
 513. See generally BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, pt. E. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Fairness, equality of treatment, and parsimony are primary 
interests in sentencing individuals. When the balance goes awry, 
political, judicial, and equitable principles are harmed. This Article 
posited a three-way circuit split in matter of law conclusions as to 
whether district judges can reject the child pornography guideline for 
a policy reason. The split is of consequence from legal and 
constitutional perspectives. The statistical analyses herein using 
Commission data showed the split also has correlative effects to 
sentences issued and to the likelihood of downward variances. The 
effects generally existed even in a multivariate regression model. 
There is an obvious reason the child pornography guideline is the 
Achilles’ heel of federal sentencing. It is nonsensical and 
incongruous with normal sentencing practices. It fails to represent the 
Commission’s institutional abilities and has not incorporated the 
federal judiciary’s learned judgments on the reasonableness of 
sentencing for these crimes. The dual concerns of severity and 
disparity are clearly intertwined here. The child pornography 
guideline recommends sentences that are extraordinarily 
disproportionate and, therefore, problematic for criminal justice in 
other ways. Overly punitive sentences infringe upon fundamental 
ideas of justice and fairness. Excessive sentences also raise questions 
about the efficient use of public monies and resources. 
This Article concludes that it is not only reasonable to reject the 
child pornography guideline; it is constitutional to do so. At the same 
time, it is most likely unconstitutional to preclude a policy rejection. 
Booker renders all guidelines advisory, and Kimbrough permits 
categorical nullification of congressional or Commission policy. The 
fact that many of the modifications to the child pornography 
guideline are direct mandates by Congress becomes irrelevant. 
Booker stands for the proposition that there can be no mandatory 
guideline. Even the executive branch appears to concede these points 
regarding policy rejection on legal and constitutional grounds. In the 
end, the status of child pornography sentencing is emblematic of 
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larger problems in federal sentencing.514 A guideline that fails to 
guide—indeed, it is widely recognized as failing to guide—raises 
issues of integrity not only with that guideline; it also invites broader 
challenges to the guidelines in toto and to the Commission’s work. 
When a problematic guideline leads to widespread disparity in 
sentences nationwide, the system is also subject to equitable 
concerns. It is likely not as much that a defendant who is sentenced 
by a judge willing to reject the guideline is lucky—considering that 
mean sentences are still quite lengthy—it is more apposite that the 
defendant who is sentenced by a judge following the guideline is 
unlucky. He likely will receive a sentence that is disproportionate to 
his offense and inconsistent with the punishment assigned to 
similarly situated offenders. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 514. Steiker, supra note 8, at 49 (referring to this guideline as showing that guided discretion can 
mask unjustified uniformities and is a “testament[] to the ‘stickiness’ of bad ideas in guiding sentencing 
discretion”). 
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